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ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY VERSUS PUBLIC CHOICE: 
THE CASE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN ROAD  
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT 
 
Jonathan Remy Nash† 
 
This Article argues, using the case of responses to traffic congestion, that public 
choice provides a greater explanation for the emergence of property rights than 
does economic efficiency. While the traditional solution to traffic congestion is to 
provide new roadway capacity, that is not an efficient response in that it does not 
lead to internalization of costs. Moreover, over time new capacity may serve to 
exacerbate congestion problems: New roadway capacity may induce additional 
travel that would not have taken place but for the new construction. By contrast, 
congestion charges—that is, imposing tolls designed to force drivers to 
internalize the costs that their driving imposes on other drivers—offer an 
efficient way to address the problem of congestion. The continued popularity, 
despite this, of providing new roadway capacity turns upon public choice theory. 
New roadway construction tends to be very attractive for politicians as a way to 
satisfy both constituents generally, as well as interest groups that tend to be well-
organized and powerful. In contrast, congestion charging regimes tend to be less 
popular across the board politically. At present, there appears currently to be 
something of a shift in position. Experimentation with congestion pricing 
programs is growing overseas—including a notable program in London—and a 
serious proposal for New York City’s central business district. This Article thus 
argues that, while political economy tends to be a powerful force, it is possible 
for concerns of efficiency to override (or at least to curtail) that force when the 
inefficiencies of a response grounded in political economy become too large. At 
the same time, public choice continues to hold considerable sway: The shift 
toward congestion pricing may require not only pressing efficiency concerns, but 
also a shift in the political climate, as evidenced by backlash against New York 
City’s proposal. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Two stories dominate the current law and economics literature on the emergence and 
development of property rights regimes. One is the optimistic story that economic efficiency 
drives the definition and resolution of property rights. The second story is grounded in public 
choice and is far more pessimistic. On this account, property rights come about when those with 
the most power in fact want them to come about. Commentators debate which of these stories, or 
perhaps more accurately what combination of them, best explains the development of property 
rights regimes in particular settings.  
 
In this Article, I address these questions in the specific setting of the societal response to 
traffic congestion. Traffic congestion is a growing problem on the nation’s roads. As land 
development continues to consume more and more previously unoccupied land, more people 
drive more vehicles greater distances. The result is traffic—lots of it. And lots of traffic has many 
deleterious effects for society. There are time delays—for both people and freight. Congestion 
also magnifies the environmental impact of driving. And, of late, congestion has come to be 
recognized as a source of “road rage.” 
 
Traffic congestion presents an excellent setting in which to gauge the effectiveness of the 
competing explanations for the development of property and governance regimes because the two 
outcomes toward which each alternative moves differ so clearly. The public choice explanation 
leads to the “solution” of expanding roadway capacity, while economic efficiency argues in favor 
of more market-based regulatory regimes governing roadway access and usage. In other words, 
efficiency argues in favor of greater property rights, while public choice instead advocates 
reducing scarcity and thus reducing the demand for property rights. 
 
Because roads are largely supplied to the public-at-large by the government, congestion 
tends to be a problem that concerns politicians. The traditional solution to a congestion problem is 
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simple: Build more roads. This can mean the addition of new lanes to existing roadways, or it can 
mean the construction of entirely new thoroughfares, expressways, and freeways. A more general 
formulation of this approach is the provision of new roadway capacity.  
 
New roadway capacity is not an efficient way to address traffic congestion. Even if 
congestion is abated, the fact remains that providing roadway capacity fails to address the 
fundamental underlying economic problem: the ability of roadway users to externalize costs on 
other roadway users and on society at large. The provision of new roadway capacity does not 
require or lead to the internalization of costs. As such, it encourages an inefficiently high level of 
use of the resource. Neither does new capacity allocate roadway capacity efficiently, to those who 
value it most.  
 
Moreover, not only is the generation of new roadway capacity not an efficient way to 
address congestion, over time new capacity may serve to exacerbate congestion problems. This is 
because of the phenomenon of “induced travel.” Essentially, new roadway capacity may induce 
additional travel that would not have taken place but for the new construction.  
 
By contrast, congestion charges offer an efficient way to address the problem of 
congestion. As opposed to simple tolls (which tend to be uniformly priced and that are intended 
simply to finance the maintenance of the roadway or to augment government coffers), congestion 
charges are, simply put, tolls that are designed to force drivers to internalize the congestion costs 
that their driving imposes on other drivers. By forcing drivers to internalize at least some of the 
negative externality that they impose by using roadways, a system of congestion charges is likely 
to reduce roadway usage closer to an efficient level. Also, the use of charges is more likely to 
result in the allocation of the resource of roadway usage to those who value it most. 
 
Despite their inferiority in terms of efficiency, the provision of new roadway capacity 
remains by far the more popular option. The reason for this can be found by looking to public 
choice theory. New roadway construction tends to be very attractive for politicians as a way to 
satisfy both constituents generally, as well as interest groups that tend to be well-organized and 
powerful. On the other hand, congestion charging regimes—depending upon the setting in which 
they are introduced—tend to be less popular across the board politically.  
 
A study the evolution of government responses to traffic congestion provides insight into 
which story of the development of property rights regimes—efficiency or public choice—holds 
sway under particular circumstances. The fact that providing new roadway capacity remains more 
popular suggests the dominance of the public choice explanation for the development of property 
rights over the story grounded in efficiency.  
 
At the same time, there appears currently to be something of a shift in position. In recent 
years, Congress has authorized pilot congestion charging regimes. Moreover, experimentation 
with congestion pricing programs is growing overseas—including a notable program in 
London—and a serious proposal for congestion pricing has emerged to govern and reduce traffic 
on New York City’s central business district.1 Further, President Bush’s Secretary of 
Transportation—Mary Peters—is a strong advocate of congestion pricing.2 This suggests that, 
while political economy tends to be a powerful force, it is possible for concerns of efficiency to 
override (or at least to curtail) that force when the inefficiencies of a response grounded in 
political economy become too large.  
                                                 
1 See infra notes 126-129 and accompanying text; infra note 234-241 and accompanying text.  
2 See Matthew Wald, Bush Chooses Transportation Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2006, at A15.  
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Yet, even in the face of weighty efficiency arguments in favor of congestion pricing, 
political opposition to such programs remains vital and often successful. First, although it was not 
enacted in that form—the fact that, this late date and despite the success of pilot congestion 
pricing programs—a bill was considered in the Senate that would have curtailed the pilot 
programs shows the continued strength of political opposition to congestion pricing.3 Second, 
consider that, even in New York City—a relatively politically homogeneous municipality in 
which reliance upon public transit is already well established and far exceeds the national norm—
opposition to congestion pricing remains strong enough to keep congestion pricing proposals 
from moving quickly beyond the proposal stage.  
 
Moreover, political economy also offers an explanation for the present shift toward 
greater embrace of congestion pricing. The frontiers of congestion pricing—that is, those settings 
where congestion pricing seems to be growing fastest—are, other than heavily urbanized areas 
where the addition of new roadways is essentially not an option—are settings in which new 
roadway construction will be subject to congestion pricing. Such an approach blunts political 
opposition to congestion pricing on the ground that it imposes new fees, since existing roadways 
remain accessible at no charge. It also draws support from the powerful construction and real 
estate industries as well as organized labor—all of which tend to benefit from new road 
construction. Finally, the introduction of congestion pricing offers a benefit to a small but 
growing constituency—industries that research and manufacture the technologies used to 
implement congestion pricing regimes.  
 
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I discuss in some greater detail the two 
competing economic explanations for the development of property rights. In Part III, I present an 
overview of the economics of roadway usage.  
 
In Parts IV and V, I evaluate the provision of new roadway capacity and congestion 
charging from the perspectives of efficiency and political economy. I argue that congestion 
charges are preferable from an efficiency standpoint, but that the provision of new roadway 
capacity is today much more likely to be the political system’s response to congestion problems. 
In Part VI, I consider whether a slight movement, of late, toward greater acceptance of congestion 
pricing may reflect the ascension of the efficiency story; I use New York City’s recent flirtation 
with congestion pricing as a case study. I conclude, however, that the public choice account 
continues to have greater explanatory power.  
 
II. COMPETING ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS FOR THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
Commentators have identified two primary reasons for the development of property 
rights. One theory is based upon notions of economic efficiency. The other is based upon support 
for property rights development on the part of powerful interest groups.4  
                                                 
3 See infra notes 182-183 and accompanying text.  
4 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J.L. STUD. S421, S423-33 (2002); 
Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 ILL. L. REV. 275, 278-81 (describing competing theories for 
the development of market-based mechanisms to govern environmental resource management: wealth-maximization 
theory, based on maximizing Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, and distribution theory, based upon interest groups and politics); 
see also Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 117, 119-24 (2005) (contrasting the Demsetzian approach with an approach that takes account of the role of 
political institutions in the development of property rights).  
Saul Levmore characterizes the efficiency story—to which he refers as the “transaction-cost” story—as more 
optimistic than the more pessimistic public choice story—to which he refers as the “interest-group” story. See 
Levmore, supra, at S432. Thomas Merrill does not seem to afford any greater moral approval to the public choice story 
by his use of the monicker “distributional theory.” Merrill explains that, because the efficiency story—to which he 
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First, building upon the work of Harold Demsetz,5 commentators have argued that 
economic efficiency drives the development and evolution of property rights. Economic 
efficiency is measured by total wealth maximization—that is, using a Kaldor-Hicks measure of 
efficiency. The notion here is that property rights will be introduced to the extent that, and in a 
way such that, the benefits derived from delineating and enforcing property rights exceed the 
attendant costs. The absence of a property regime (or the absence of a sufficiently mature 
property regime) may mean, where a resource is scarce, that societal actors engage in “rent 
dissipation”—that is, wasteful activity to try to capture the economic rents associated with the 
scarce resource6—and that users of the resource are able to externalize costs on others and thus 
artificially keep their own costs down.7 Thus, the introduction of a property regime (or, as 
appropriate, the introduction of a more mature property regime) offers the benefit of reducing 
these problems. But the implementation (or upgrade) of a property rights regimes has costs as 
well, including “the costs of defining property rights, identifying the owners of such rights, and 
protecting the rights against interference by others.”8  
 
The efficiency hypothesis claims that a new property regime will be implemented when 
the benefits of the new regime outweigh its costs. It also claims that an existing property rights 
regime will be dismantled (and perhaps a less mature regime introduced) when the costs of the 
regime exceed its benefits.9 These claims make it possible to identify several conditions that will 
determine whether, and when, regimes will be created or dismantled: resource scarcity, 
externality size, and administration costs. First, as a resource grows scarcer, it is more likely that 
a property regime governing the resource will be introduced; conversely, if the resource becomes 
more readily available, a property regime becomes less necessary.10 Second, as the externalities 
associated with resource use become larger, it becomes more cost-effective to have a property 
regime, with a property regime less cost-effective as externalities shrink.11 Third, a reduction in 
administrative costs makes a property rights regime more likely; an increase makes one less 
likely.12  
 
A second explanation that commentators offer to explain the development of property 
rights is grounded upon the theory of public choice.13 In general, public choice theory looks at 
government action as the result of a “market for government action.” Under this model, 
                                                                                                                                                 
refers as the “wealth maximization theory”—looks only to overall societal balance between benefits and costs, it cares 
only that a surplus of benefits over costs exists, not how that surplus is distributed among societal actors. See Merrill, 
supra, at 278-79. Conversely, the public choice story takes into account the distribution of assets—indeed, it may 
generate property rights regimes that “fail to maximize societal wealth,” id. at 280—but the distribution that emerges 
will not be based (at least not reliably) upon equitable considerations, but rather upon the political power of various 
interest groups. See id. (Society “will adopt those regimes whose distributional features are most favorable to the 
groups that can organize most effectively to influence the political process.”).  
5 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. PAP. & PROC. 347 (1967).  
6 Merrill, supra note 4, at 278.  
7 Id.  
8 Id.  
9 See Levmore, supra note 4, at S424-25 (noting that the evolution of property rights is not a one-way street, and 
discussing the possibility of property rights regimes devolving). 
10 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 
1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 5-8 (describing how greater scarcity of a resource may prompt environmental regulation).  
11 See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 5, at 350; Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies for 
Delineating Property Rights, 31 J.L. STUD. 453, 462-63 (2002).  
12 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 11, at 464 (noting that, “with the invention of barbed wire, . . . [the marginal cost of 
delineating property rights] shifts down, and we get more activity in delineating and enforcing rights to grazing areas”).  
13 See generally DANIEL FARBER & PHILIP FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991). 
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government actors take steps that are designed to maximize their chances of remaining in power; 
for legislators, this means taking actions that maximize their reelection chances.14  
 
The public choice model predicts that government actors will act in response to pressure 
brought by interest groups. Interest groups give rise to demand for certain government actions, 
and government actors offer supply in the form of support for different government actions.15 
Thus, an action is more likely to be taken when it is (i) demanded by more, and more powerful, 
interest groups, and (ii) supported by more, and more powerful, government actors. In the 
environmental arena, relevant interest groups are likely to be industry actors or groups, and 
environmental interest organizations.16  
 
While it retains a focus on the actions and demands of interest groups, public choice 
theory does not suggest that government actors will be oblivious to, or act blithely contrary to, the 
broadly held wishes of their constituents. Ultimately, for legislators and executives, it is the 
electorate who decides whether they will remain in power. The question remains how public 
opinion may reach and influence politicians. First, it is conceivable that “voters sometimes 
exercise influence in ways that bypass interest groups.”17 Second, public choice theory recognizes 
the possibility that public opinion on an issue will be enlisted by “political entrepreneurs.”18 
Political entrepreneurs harness latent public sentiment to achieve particular goals—usually seen 
as furthering his or own career, though perhaps also furthering the public interest. Note that 
representatives of special interest organizations—in the purported public interest or otherwise—
may act as political entrepreneurs in order to use public opinion to further the agenda of the 
relevant interest groups.19  
                                                 
14 See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974). 
15 See Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz & Robert N. Stavins. 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 325-47 (1998) 
(describing such a marketplace for environmental regulation).  
16 For the quintessential argument that environmental regulation is the result of a perhaps surprising alliance 
between environmental “public interest” organizations and industry, or firms within an industry, see BRUCE YANDLE, 
COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 68-79 (1997) (drawing the parallel between the alliance 
between Baptists and Bootleggers to produce “Sunday Blue Laws,” and contrasting the “Baptist and Bootlegger” model 
with other models of regulation). For an argument that environmental interest organizations act in their own political 
and economic self-interest, see Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political 
Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845 (1999). For deeper study of environmental 
organizations from the perspective of political economy, see Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists? The Political Economy of 
Environmental Interest Groups, 53 CASE W. L. REV. 315 (2002).  
17 David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 436 (2002). Spence 
elucidates: 
[P]oliticians can help broader, less wealthy, mass interest groups to overcome [collective action] 
disadvantages, particularly in higher-salience policy debates. In debates over the kind of high-salience issues 
that produce major regulatory legislation (the kind that establish an agency's general mission), politicians act 
as political entrepreneurs, recognizing the political benefits of rallying the unorganized supporters of public 
interest policy goals. This is the so-called "republican moment" explanation for major regulatory legislation 
Id. (footnote omitted). Note that Spence’s explanation of the phenomenon itself credits politicians as “political 
entrepreneurs,” see infra note 18.  
18 See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86 
MICH. L. REV. 930, 976 (1988) (referring to a “political entrepreneur” as one “who hopes to enhance his own career 
through the success of an organization with which he is associated, or by serving as a symbol around which diffuse, 
nonorganized individuals can coalesce” (footnote omitted)); William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory 
Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 54 (2003) (noting that political entrepreneurs “emerge 
when they can advance politically by offering constituents a collective benefit, even where constituents lack sufficient 
interest to engage in concerted political action”); cf. William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 247, 271 (2001) (describing political entrepreneurs as “[p]ublic-spirited or perhaps 
opportunistic”).  
19 See, e.g., Dale B. Thompson, Political Obstacles to the Implementation of Emissions Markets: Lessons from 
RECLAIM, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 645, 664-66 (2000) (discussing the possible role of industry representatives as 
political entrepreneurs to harness public opinion against application to individuals of a Los Angeles metropolitan area 
Economic Efficiency versus Public Choice 7
 
The question remains open as to which of these stories—or what combination of them—
most accurately describes the evolution—or devolution, or lack of evolution—of property rights 
under which circumstances. In the succeeding Parts, I analyze this question in the context of 
property rights in roadway access. It turns out that one response to traffic congestion—congestion 
pricing—is favored under the efficiency story, while another response—the provision of new 
roadway capacity—is favored under the public choice story. Because the congestion pricing 
solution is a property-based solution while new roadway capacity (which purports to solve the 
problem by providing more of the resource, thus reducing scarcity), the setting of roadway access 
is an apt one in which to measure the accuracy of the competing stories at predicting the 
evolution of property rights.  
 
III. OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMICS OF ROADWAY USAGE  
 
A. Roads as an Open Access Resource 
 
Roads tend to be provided by the government.20 The use of most roads, moreover, is 
provided at no charge to individual users; the roads are funded at taxpayer expense.21 Access is 
unrestricted.22 
                                                                                                                                                 
trading scheme designed to control nitrogen and sulfur dioxide emissions); Hale E. Sheppard, The NAFTA Trucking 
Dispute: Pretexts for Noncompliance and Policy Justifications for U.S. Facilitation of Cross-Border Services, 11 
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 235, 254-56 (2002) (noting ulterior motives of unions—in seeking domestic job protection—
in opposing opening the United States to trucks from Mexico under NAFTA by harnessing public opinion against the 
idea on the ground that the agreement would compromise public safety); id. at 256 (noting possible ulterior motive of 
public interest organization—favoring rails over roads for cargo transportation—for opposing opening the United 
States to trucks from Mexico).  
20 This was not always the case. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1383 (1993) (“Private 
toll roads were in fact familiar features of the early Nineteenth Century American landscape.”); see also FEDERAL 
HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, TOLL FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES: BRIDGES – TUNNELS – ROADS – FERRIES iii-iv 
(June 2003) (available at www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/tollpage.htm) (presenting a history of toll roads in the United 
States).  
For discussion of the reasons for the shift away from privately-owned toll roads, see Richard A. Epstein, The 
Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 J.L. STUD. S515, S522 (2002) (“The state monopoly [over 
highways] is intended to counteract the Balkanization of transportation services that would necessarily arise if 
ownership of the highway system were distributed among several private parties, each with the absolute right to 
exclude others.”); see generally Ellickson, supra, at 1381-85 (describing, in economic terms, the natural evolution of 
government provision of roads); Levmore, supra note 4, at S434-35 (same); but cf. id. at S435-36 (providing an 
alternative, interest-group explanation for the provision and ownership of roads). Although roads provide a benefit for 
local users, the fact that they also serve a broader societal need suggests that they should be provided by governments 
at higher levels than local governments. See Roger Nober, Note, Federal Highways and Environmental Litigation: 
Toward a Theory of Public Choice and Administrative Reaction, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 229, 237 (1990). 
Despite history movement away from privately-owned roads, and the traditional justifications for public ownership 
of highways, there are some signs of a resurgence in privately-owned highways, at least in some areas of the country. 
See, e.g., Patrick Jackson & J.L. Miller, Privatizing Highways: Solution or Setback? Nationwide, Roads Being Leased 
with Mixed Results, WILMINGTON NEWS JOURNAL, Nov. 27, 2005, at 3; Steven Ginsburg, Tolls Soon Could Be Core of 
Commute; Express Network Swiftly Taking Form, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2005, at A1 (describing likely construction of 
network of express lanes in the metropolitan Washington area, “many of which will be built and operated by private 
firms”); Steven Ginsburg, Australian Firm Buys Greenway; Company is Latest to Enter D.C. Market as Privatization 
Spreads, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2005, at B3 (noting the purchase of a private road in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan 
area by “a major player . . . at a time when officials are considering privatizing many of the region’s roads”).  
21 See Ellickson, supra note 20, at 1384 (“Public-finance theorists argue that, once a right-of-way has been 
provided, the marginal costs of accommodating an additional traveler on it are close to zero (at least until the road 
becomes congested). When this is so, it is socially optimal not to levy tolls. In addition, especially on little traveled 
ways, the administrative costs of collecting tolls from trip-takers are usually prohibitive.”); Levmore, supra note 4, at 
S434-35 (offering an explanation for government provision of road access at no charge based upon the “expenses 
associated with toll collection”). Ellickson anticipated that technological development might facilitate toll collection—
and even the use of discriminatory pricing. See Ellickson, supra note 20, at 1384 n.353. And, indeed, such 
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At low levels of usage, free roads provided by the government fall within the ambit of 
“public goods.”23 The classic definition describes public goods as fulfilling two criteria: jointness 
in supply (or nonrival consumption)—meaning that the consumption of the good by one person 
does not diminish or otherwise interfere with others’ consumption of the good—and impossibility 
of exclusion—meaning that, once the good is in supply, no one can be prevented from consuming 
the good.24 Public roads certainly meet the latter criterion: Once a public road is opened, all 
members of the public are free to use the road;25 they are an open-access resource.26 And, the use 
of the road by relatively few does not diminish or interfere with others’ use of the road. 
 
But the former criterion—jointness in supply—is not met for higher levels of usage:27 
The use of the road by large numbers of people may lead to congestion, which will interfere with 
people’s consumption of the good. Tirza Wahrman explains: 
 
Congestion is a classic negative externality. As additional road users occupy the 
road, the quality of service provided to all users declines. When drivers use a 
highway, they do not pay the costs they are imposing on other drivers by adding 
to their delay. The only “costs” incurred by the single driver are running costs 
and her own time delay. Traffic should flow smoothly at the speed limit. As 
traffic increases, however, the eventual addition of one more vehicle will slow 
the flow and increase the travel time of other vehicles. At this point, congestion 
begins.28 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
technological evolution has come to pass. See Tirza S. Wahrman, Breaking the Logjam: The Peak Pricing of Congested 
Urban Roadways Under the Clean Air Act to Improve Air Quality and Reduce Vehicle Miles Traveled, 8 DUKE ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y F. 181, 196 (1998) (“It is only recently that the concept [of congestion pricing] became administratively 
feasible with the introduction of electronic tolls and computerized toll cards.”). 
22 See, e.g., 39A C.J.S. Highways § 1 (2003) (“The term ‘highway’ means a way open to all the people without 
distinction for passage and repassage at their pleasure . . . .”). 
23 Cf. Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Public Goods, 
108 YALE L.J. 377, 377 (1998) (identifying roads as an example of a public good); Emily Sherwin, Epstein’s Property, 
19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 697, 700 (2000) (same). 
24 E.g., Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 67 B.U. L. 
REV. 795, 801-02 (1987).  
25 Shi-Ling Hsu, A Two-Dimensional Framework for Analyzing Property Rights Regimes, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
813, 838 (2003) (“Roads are an imperfect example of [j]oint [u]se because obeying traffic laws is a condition to their 
use. But for the most part, we have decided that transportation is important enough that there should be no exclusions, 
which would not be the case if, for example, tolls were imposed to alleviate congestion.”); Mark A. Lemley, 
Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521, 534 (2001) (“Roads . . . have some of the characteristics of a public good: it is 
difficult to exclude nonpaying users.”). 
26 See Ellickson, supra note 20, at 1381 (noting the important distinction, ignored by Garrett Hardin, between open-
access property that anyone can enter, and limited-access property that is open only to a limited portion of the 
populace); Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J.L. STUD. 
S331, S335 (2002) (noting the same distinction, and observing that it was ignored by Harold Demsetz). 
27 See infra Figure 1 (graph depicts the private costs and social costs curve as collinear until a particular threshold 
level of trips per hour is reached, indicating that negative externalities do not arise until the threshold level is reached). 
Mark Hall and John Colombo explain: 
Many services that are said to be public goods do not actually face an absolute indivisibility problem. Instead, 
it is merely difficult or uneconomical to assess each consumer's benefit and, therefore, charge him or her 
appropriately. For instance, when the government builds a road, it sometimes erects a toll booth to charge the 
particular drivers who use the road, suggesting that a private good is involved. It is not impossible to do this 
for every road, but in most circumstances this form of revenue collection is less efficient than simply taxing 
all residents. Thus, some goods become “public” at one price (or level of production) but not at another. 
Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379, 1395 
(1991).  
28 Wahrman, supra note 21, at 196. 
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Roads thus do not fall within the definition of a classic public good.29 They are, rather, 
“congestible public goods.”30 At higher levels of usage, the road is an open-access resource for 
which use by an individual generates negative externalities on other users.31 The externality arises 
because of the differential between the costs that individual users see and the actual total costs. 
As congestion grows, this differential gets larger, meaning that the congestion externality 
worsens.32  
 
B. Roadway Usage and Negative Externalities 
 
The fact that users externalize some of the costs of public roadway usage gives rise to 
two problems.33 First, there will likely be an inefficient allocation of the roadway resource. The 
resource will probably not be allocated to those who value it most. Second, the level of road 
usage is not efficient. Because of the negative externalities, the roadways are overused.  
 
First, the scarce resource of roadway space likely will not be allocated efficiently, to 
those who value it most.34 In the absence of any organized top-down system, roadway space will 
probably be allocated on the basis of time and effort, according to a “rule of first capture.”35 
Maintaining an open-access free roadway is tantamount to distributing a valuable resource with a 
                                                 
29 Börje Johansson and Lars-Göran Mattsson explain ways in which roads fall within, and outside, the definition of 
a classic public good. See Börje Johansson & Lars-Göran Mattsson, Principles of Road Pricing, in ROAD PRICING: 
THEORY, EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT AND POLICY 7, 9-10 (Börje Johansson & Lars-Göran Mattsson eds., 1995) 
[hereinafter ROAD PRICING]. They distinguish between actual use of a road as opposed to a road’s potential capacity. 
See id. at 9. Viewed in terms of its capacity, a road “can be appreciated over time as a potential capacity, even by those 
individuals who do not use it regularly.” Id.  
With respect to use, Johansson and Mattsson explain that “[t]he use of a road is . . . only nonrivalrous within given 
bounds”—i.e., to the extent that congestion does not develop. Id. at 10. As such, only “within limits” can “the normal 
use of road space . . . be categorised as collective.” Id.  
In analyzing a road’s potential capacity, Johansson and Mattsson analogize to a firehouse: Just as “[t]he capacity of 
the fire brigade is kept in readiness,” id., the potential capacity of a road highlights its “insurance aspect” or “readiness 
feature,” id. Moreover, this “potential value” is “not necessarily rivalrous.” Id. Thus, “road capacity is . . . a public 
resource with regard to its insurance properties.” Id.  
30 E.g., Gillette & Hopkins, supra note 24, at 802 n.23 (“[G]oods may have ‘public’ characteristics without being 
‘pure’ public goods. For instance, congested public goods, like highways or national parks, may exist in which use is 
nonrival up to a point, although additional users may reduce the enjoyment of other users.”); John A. Henning, Jr., 
Comment, Mitigating Price Effects with a Housing Linkage Fee, 78 CAL. L. REV. 721, 743 (1990).  
31 Even at low levels of roadway usage, driving a vehicle generates pollution that may, in whole or in part, be an 
externality. But, to the extent that is the case, the externality is the result of driving, not usage of any particular 
roadway. However, congestion itself may exacerbate the amount of pollution generated; the marginal additional 
pollution is an externality that results from congestion. See infra Fig. 1. See also Craig N. Oren, Getting Commuters 
Out of Their Cars: What Went Wrong?, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 141, 201 (1998) (noting that “traffic congestion and air 
pollution are not entirely congruous problems, and so have different solutions”; “[t]rip reduction for the sake of 
congestion relief largely takes the form of shifting employee trips out of a narrow peak period”). 
32 Timothy Hau elucidates: 
[I]magine a motorist entering a road that is initially traffic-free. . . . As more and more vehicles enter the 
traffic stream, traffic speed slows, and average travel time increases. However, the cost of an incremental trip 
to society – the marginal cost – rises faster than its average (time) cost. If that last trip were to be averted, 
travel time savings to other users on the facility would in fact be reaped . . . . 
Timothy D. Hau, A Conceptual Framework for Pricing Congestion and Road Damage, in ROAD PRICING, supra note 
29, at 57, 58. 
33 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 486 
(2003) (distinguishing between technological externalities—which impose a “real cost on third parties”—and pecuniary 
externalities—which simply “alter[ ] the distribution of wealth,” and noting that congestion “could impose either type 
of externality, or both types”). 
34 Hsu, supra note 25, at 838 (“[W]hen highways become congested, [j]oint [u]se fails in that allocations of use are 
not necessarily made in an economically efficient manner.”). 
35 See generally Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 75, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
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price cap of zero. When scarce goods are made available at less than their true cost, a shadow 
market will develop in some other form of effective currency.36 For example, when a popular 
baseball team makes playoff tickets available to the general public, ticket-purchaser lines often 
form well in advance of the sale of tickets.37 This suggests that demand for the ticket outstrips 
supply, i.e., the tickets are priced below what the standard market would bear, and that, as a 
consequence, people are willing to bid time (in place of money) in an effort to garner tickets.38 
Similarly, cities often offer street or municipal lot parking at rates far below the rates charged by 
private parking facilities (perhaps even free of charge);39 as a consequence, drivers expend 
considerable time and effort in searching for available metered or free parking.40 In effect, time 
and effort become the primary commodities according to which the resource is allocated. An 
appropriate adaptation of the “rule of first capture” prevails.41 
 
In the case of roadways, time, presumably, will be the primary factor in allocating the 
resource. People’s demand for roadway space will vary inversely with the time it takes to drive a 
mile, since “[a]t some level of congestion, any given driver will choose to avoid dealing with that 
congestion, either by choosing an alternative route or mode, changing the departure time of the 
trip, selecting a shorter trip to a similar activity, or avoiding the trip entirely.”42 For any given 
level of congestion, then, the drivers who gain access to the resource are those who are willing to 
accept the drive with that level of congestion.43 
 
But the “rule of first capture,” based as it is on expenditures of time and effort, is not 
likely to achieve an efficient allocation of the resource. Economically speaking, each person will 
decide how much time to put into searching for an inexpensive parking space based upon the 
relative value of the person’s time to the expense of a “full-freight” parking space.44 Thus, an 
individual who values an inexpensive parking space more than a second individual may 
nevertheless not pursue—and therefore not obtain—an inexpensive parking space if the second 
person values her time so much less than first person values his, such that it is economically 
rational for the first person, but not the second, to invest considerable time and effort in searching 
for an inexpensive parking space.45 
 
In the case of roadways, persons who would pay considerable amounts of money to gain 
access to a relatively uncongested roadway in the end may not use the roadway because it is not 
                                                 
36 See generally GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5-6 (1976). 
37 Stephen Lynch, Angels Fans Rally for Playoff Tickets, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Sept. 22, 2002, at 1 (“[M]ost of 
the [Anaheim Angels’] first-game playoff tickets went to fans who lined up for at least 24 hours.”). 
38 Cf. BECKER, supra note 36, at 6 (describing “office waiting time for physicians” as “one component of the full 
price of physician services”). 
39 Epstein, supra note 20, at S534. Epstein speculates that distributive justice may explain this discrepancy. See id. I 
return to this point below, in the context of congestion charging, see infra notes 210-213, 224, and accompanying text.  
Some municipalities offer street parking to neighborhood residents for a fixed, relatively inexpensive fee. For a 
description of a proposal to introduce such a program in New York City, see John Rosenthal, Give Residents a Place to 
Park, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2004, sec. 4, at 7. 
40 See Epstein, supra note 20, at S521-28. 
41 See id. at S523-24 (drawing the analogy between the “rule of first capture” in Pierson for foxes, and the 
allocation of parking spaces). 
42 Lewis M. Fulton, Robert B. Noland, Daniel J. Meszler & John V. Thomas, A Statistical Analysis of Induced 
Travel Effects in the U.S. Mid-Atlantic Region, 3 J. TRANSP. & STATISTICS 1, 3 (2000).  
43 Drivers might make these decisions on a daily—e.g., what route to take that day and what time to travel—or 
overall basis—e.g., where to live. But the overall point remains the same.  
44 See BECKER, supra note 36, at 6 (footnote omitted).  
45 Conceivably, this situation could be ameliorated through Coasean bargaining, see generally R.H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), if the first person were able to bargain with the second person, and 
purchase the parking space for cash. But the transactions costs are likely to be prohibitively high in most such 
circumstances. Cf. infra note 46 (explaining why time-cost is generally not monetizable).  
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worth the investment of time that road usage requires. Instead, the resource of roadway usage 
may go to people who value the resource less, but who also value their time less such that it is 
worth it to them to expend their (relatively lower-valued) time to obtain roadway usage. In the 
absence of a private market, the time-based allocations will prevail.46 And there is no easy way 
for a private market in roadway usage to arise.47 
 
A second effect of the negative externality on roadway usage is that the level of usage 
will be inefficiently high. At higher levels of usage where congestion occurs, a road is an open-
access resource for which use by an individual generates negative externalities on other users. 
Commentators have identified such a circumstance as potentially subject to a “tragedy of the 
commons.”48 The ability to externalize costs on others gives rise to an incentive to overconsume 
the resource. Although individuals—and society generally—would be better off if everyone 
agreed not to overuse the resource, every individual has an economic incentive to defect and 
overconsume the resource.49 Because individual users experience are able to externalize some of 
the costs of roadway usage, individuals use the road who would not use the road were they forced 
to bear the full, actual costs of their roadway usage.  
 
The critical point is that the costs that an individual roadway user sees (in the absence of 
congestion charges or some other method of cost-internalization) is less than the actual, total 
societal costs of that user’s usage.50 Economic analysis suggests that an individual who is 
considering using a particular roadway will determine whether or not to do so based upon a 
balancing of the marginal benefit derived from using the road (as opposed to the other option(s)) 
against the marginal costs associated with roadway usage. Prospective users can expect to bear 
some costs themselves, including travel time, gasoline, oil, and vehicle wear-and-tear.51 But, to 
the extent that congestion exists, prospective users can expect to externalize some of their costs 
on other users. Thus, we can expect that some users for whom the actual marginal costs of 
roadway usage would outweigh the marginal benefits will choose nonetheless to use the road 
because of the ability to externalize some costs.   
 
This is depicted in Figure 1. The aggregate demand curve for roadway usage in the 
absence of full internalization is represented by curve D as the demand for travel per time interval 
as a function of cost (including time). D’s negative slope reflects the fact that, as a general matter, 
the more costly it is to drive a given distance, the fewer the number of drivers who will actually 
drive (and the shorter the trips they will tend to take); thus, the amount of traffic volume 
demanded decreases as the cost of travel increases.52  
                                                 
46 Time-cost is in general not monetizable:  
[I]f the [extent of the congestion] queue can be predicted on a daily, weekly, seasonal, or some other basis, 
people will recognize this and include it in their decision process. For example, if people feel that a given trip 
will take a half hour longer than other times of the day, with all the attendant woes of stop and go travel, they 
may conclude that it is not worth going. Congestion in that sense provides its own toll. If everyone knows 
that the trip will take a half hour longer, only those will go that value the trip above that. But there is no 
option to trade away money for that time. It is gone, and that is that. 
ROBERT G. MCGILLIVRAY, ON ROAD CONGESTION THEORY 2-3 (1974). 
47 A private market here is even harder to imagine than in the case of parking spots. Commuter meeting zones may 
be one example of an attempt in the context of HOV lanes.  
48 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 168 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).  
49 The likelihood of the undesirable outcome results from the fact that the tragedy of the commons puts individuals 
in a multiple-player prisoner’s dilemma-style game. On the prisoner’s dilemma game generally, and on the relation of 
the prisoner’s dilemma to the tragedy of the commons, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. 
PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 33-34 (1994). 
50 See supra text accompanying note 28.  
51 Wahrman, supra note 21, at 197. 
52 See supra text accompanying note 42.  
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FIGURE 1: Roadway Usage and Congestion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The curve labeled “APC” represents the average perceived costs to roadway users.53 Even 
at low levels of roadway usage—i.e., in the absence of congestion—roadway users experience 
some costs.54 But these costs will remain essentially stable (on a per unit basis) until congestion 
develops (represented by the relatively flat APC curve to the left of the point fc, where congestion 
develops). The presence of congestion increases the costs of driving a given distance: Certainly, 
the time required to drive will increase, and it is likely too that the amounts of gasoline and oil 
used, and general vehicle wear-and-tear, will increase with the congestion level.55 This is 
represented by the upward slope of the APC curve to the right of point fc.  
 
The curve labeled “MC” represents the actual marginal costs to roadway users. The MC 
curve is coextensive with the APC curve for points to the left of fc, reflecting the notion that 
actual congestion costs equal perceived congestion costs where there is no congestion externality. 
The MC curve slopes upward to the right of fc, for the same reasons that the APC curve does: 
Congestion leads to longer travel times, increased gasoline and oil usage, and greater vehicle 
wear-and-tear. But the MC curve rises more quickly than does the APC curve, since the MC 
curve includes the costs that a new driver’s entry has on all drivers. 
 
In the absence of internalization of congestion costs, an equilibrium will be reached at the 
point where the APC curve intersects the demand for travel curve. As depicted in Figure 1, then, 
the equilibrium will involve a traffic flow of f0 at a unit cost of c0.56 However, if drivers were 
forced to internalize congestion costs, the equilibrium that then would obtain would be at the 
intersection of the MC curve and the demand for travel curve: There would be traffic flow f* at a 
                                                 
53 Note that this curve, and the “marginal total cost” curve described below, refer only to variable costs of driving, 
not the fixed costs (such as automobile ownership). See, e.g., Johansson & Mattsson, supra note 29, at 29 tbl. 1.3 
(distinguishing between fixed and variable costs in this context). 
54 See supra text accompanying note 51. 
55 See Wahrman, supra note 21, at 197. 
56 See Fulton et al., supra note 42, at 3. 
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unit cost of c*. Note, then, that the absence of internalization has the effect of both increasing the 
total traffic flow (since f0 > f*) and decreasing the unit cost each driver faces (since c0 < c*).57 
 
In addition to misallocation of the resource and overusage to which the congestion 
externality gives rise, the congestion externality also introduces some corollary effects. 
Congestion delays people and goods from reaching their destinations, and increases the frequency 
of vehicular accidents.58 Congestion also imposes costs on the public-at-large: traffic delays 
increase the amount of pollution that a vehicular trip generates.59 One commentator estimates that 
“[s]top-and-go driving costs Americans an estimated $168 billion a year,”60 of which “as much as 
15%, or $25 billion, falls on the public, in time lost by non-motorists (walkers, cyclists, bus 
passengers) and municipal vehicles.”61 Congestion is also a source of road rage, which itself can 
lead to accidents and other conflagrations.62 In addition, the artificially low price of driving 
(because of the congestion externality) means that government must subsidize mass transit 
substantially (i.e., even more than it otherwise would have to) in order to induce people to utilize 
mass transit.63 In short, the deleterious effects of congestion on drivers, passengers, and society in 
general, are substantial.64 
 
In the next two Parts, I consider two governmental responses to traffic congestion: the 
generation of additional roadway capacity and congestion pricing.  
 
                                                 
57 The figure does not capture the first effect of the negative externality—the inefficient allocation of the resource, 
i.e., that the smaller number of vehicle miles in fact used are probably allocated to different sets of drivers.  
58 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodifying California’s 
Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1237 (2000); MCGILLIVRAY, supra note 46, at 2 (listing “increased hazard” as a 
result of congestion). 
59 Strahilevitz, supra note 58, at 1237. 
60 Charles Komanoff, Pollution Taxes for Roadway Transportation, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 121, 129 (1994). 
61 Id.  
62 Wahrman, supra note 21, at 182; but cf. Robert F. Blomquist, “Road Rage”: A Scary and Tangled Cultural-
Legal Pastiche, 80 NEB. L. REV. 17, 36-37 (2001) (critiquing Wahrman for ignoring causes of “road rage” other than 
traffic congestion). On the general topic of “road rage,” see Blomquist, supra.  
63 See Charles J. Goetz, The Revenue Potential of User-Related Charges in State and Local Governments, in 
BROAD-BASED TAXES: NEW OPTIONS AND SOURCES 113, 122-23 (Richard A. Musgrave ed., 1973) (“The relative use of 
mass transportation versus private vehicular transportation is clearly affected by the respective prices of the two modes 
of transportation. . . . If . . . vehicular traffic is underpriced, excessive traffic-congestion costs may sensibly be avoided 
by underpricing the use of mass transportation.”).  
64 See, e.g., R.H.M. EMMERINK, INFORMATION AND PRICING IN ROAD TRANSPORTATION 3-4 (1997) ([T]he costs of 
congestion are too large to be ignored.”). 
Beyond clearly deleterious effects, such as those discussed in the text, congestion may have other unanticipated 
effects on behavior. See, e.g., Francine Parnes, Business Travel: Gaining Time and Clients While in the Pilot’s Seat, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at C8 (noting that “many executives, frustrated by delays at commercial airports and on 
clogged interstates,” are obtaining pilot licenses and buying private planes in order to “beat the crowds”). 
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IV. THE DOMINANT RESPONSE TO TRAFFIC CONGESTION: THE GENERATION OF 
ADDITIONAL ROADWAY CAPACITY 
 
In this Part, I consider the dominant governmental response to traffic congestion: the 
generation of additional roadway capacity. First, I elucidate ways in which the government might 
generate roadway capacity. Second, I explain how generating additional roadway capacity may be 
inefficient. Not only may the provision of new roadway capacity not efficiently reduce traffic 
congestion, it may under some circumstances worsen it. Third, I discuss how, notwithstanding 
new roadway capacity’s efficiency shortcomings, public choice helps to explain its continued 
dominance as a governmental response.  
 
Roadway capacity can be increased in different ways. First, the government might 
construct an entirely new roadway. Second, the government might construct new lanes on an 
existing roadway. Third, the government might convert what previously had served as a 
“breakdown lane”—that is, a shoulder lane that was designed to be used as a place to leave 
malfunctioning vehicles out of the path of traffic (and perhaps also to allow easy passage for 
police and other emergency vehicles)—into a lane usable by ordinary vehicles.65 Fourth, the 
government might have lanes that reverse direction depending upon the extent of traffic flow 
during different times of day.66 Fifth, the government might dedicate particular lanes to “express 
use”—i.e., limited ability to enter into, and leave from, those lanes to the rest of the expressway 
and other roads.67 
 
 “The traditional instrument to tackle the congestion problem is to build more road 
infrastructure.”68 But, for several reasons, the generation of new roadway capacity is not as 
attractive an option as it at first might seem. First, to the extent that the new capacity does not 
eliminate, but merely ameliorates somewhat, traffic congestion without reducing externalities, the 
resource will continue to be overused and not allocated efficiently among users.69 Second, “the 
social and environmental consequences of building new roads could be far more severe than the 
beneficial effects to motorists.”70 Third, some urban areas are already so developed that it is 
“physically impossible to enlarge the existing road infrastructure without undue expense.”71  
 
Fourth, even putting the first two problems to the side, the fundamental justification for 
providing new roadway capacity—that it at least ameliorates traffic congestion—is erroneous. 
The logic underlying new road construction rests upon the assumption that demand for travel is 
                                                 
65 For example, the Interstate 95-State Route 128 highway in eastern Massachusetts authorizes the use of the 
breakdown lane for ordinary traffic from 6:00 to 10:00 a.m. and from 3:00 to 7:00 p.m. every day. 
66 For example, the Connecticut Avenue artery into Washington features two lanes that reverse direction: During 
rush hours, the two lanes go in the direction of heavy traffic flow, while at other times one of the two lanes flows in 
each direction. The lower level of New York City’s Queensboro Bridge used to have five lanes, with the middle lane 
switching direction during rush hours. (Some years ago the middle lane was eliminated altogether.) Also, the elevated 
Queens Midtown Expressway portion of the Long Island Expressway in Queens features a dedicated “bus lane” (open 
to commuter buses and taxis with fares) during the morning rush hour. The bus lane uses what is ordinarily one of the 
three outbound lanes of the expressway. 
67 For example, Chicago’s Dan Ryan Expressway has two express lanes that reverse direction depending upon the 
time of day. New Jersey features express lanes on portions of the New Jersey Turnpike (at no additional charge) and on 
portions of Interstate 78 (a free road, both for local and express usage). 
68 EMMERINK, supra note 64, at 4; accord GAO, SURFACE AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION—DEVELOPING 
STRATEGIES FOR ENHANCING MOBILITY: A NATIONAL CHALLENGE 40 (2002) (GAO-02-0775).  
69 See supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.  
70 EMMERINK, supra note 64, at 4 
71 Id. An exception—probably made possible by a great concentration of power, probably unrealizable today—was 
Robert Moses’s ability to build roads through existing neighborhoods in New York City. See generally ROBERT A. 
CARO, THE POWER BROKER (1974). 
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essentially a function of demand for economic activities, exogenous to travel capacity, i.e., that 
demand for travel is substantially inelastic to the time-cost of travel: “Planners have historically 
considered transportation demand as a derived demand for economic activities and have assumed 
that travelers will change their behavior as their desire to engage in alternative activities changes 
over time.”72 As commentators explain, “This leads to the assertion that capacity increases, 
including increases in transit capacity, will be effective in reducing congestion and are needed to 
account for exogenous growth in travel.”73 In other words, if travel demand is inelastic in relation 
to time-cost of travel, then it stands to reason that new roads will reduce congestion. This notion 
is reflected in Figure 2, which presents an inelastic demand curve, D, and two average perceived 
cost curves—APC0, the initial average perceived cost of roadway usage, and APC1, the average 
perceived cost of roadway usage after new construction. The rightward shift in APC curve from 
APC0 to APC1 results in a drop in the cost of travel from c0 to c1, while traffic flow remains 
constant at level f. 
 
FIGURE 2: Roadway Usage under Inelastic Demand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This result may seem somewhat intuitive. In fact, however, recent research findings 
suggest that it is not the case at all. This is because of the phenomenon of “induced travel.”  
 
Induced travel is the notion that new road construction spurs new demand for travel, such 
that in the end congestion on the newly expanded road system is no better, and indeed perhaps 
even worse, than it was before.74 Lewis Fulton, Robert Noland, Daniel Meszler, and John Thomas 
conducted a study on vehicle miles traveled in the mid-Atlantic region of the United States. Their 
data analysis indicates “a significant relationship between the level of highway capacity . . . and 
the level of travel.”75 
 
                                                 
72 Fulton et al., supra note 42, at 2; accord Robert B.. Noland & William A. Cowart, Analysis of Metropolitan 
Highway Capacity and the Growth in Vehicle Miles of Travel, 27 TRANSP. 363, 364 (2000).  
73 Fulton et al., supra note 42, at 2. 
74 Fulton et al., supra note 42, at 2.  
The legal academic literature has taken limited notice of induced travel demand. See Salvatore Massa, Surface 
Freight Transportation: Accounting for Subsidies in a “Free Market”, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 285, 331 (2000-
2001); Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart Growth: The Promise, Politics, and Potential Pitfalls of Emerging Growth 
Management Strategies, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 247, 266 n.64 (2000); Gilbert Paul Verbit, The Urban Transportation 
Problem, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 368, 390 (1975). 
75 Fulton et al., supra note 42, at 13. The study measures highway capacity in lane-miles and level of travel in daily 
vehicle-miles traveled. Id.  
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The model described above (and depicted in Figure 2) failed to take into account the 
“induced travel” phenomenon because that model took a static view: It assumed that the total 
number of vehicle miles would not change simply upon the construction of new roadways. 
Instead, as Figure 1 indicated, the demand for travel is probably downward sloping. As such, a 
rightward shift in the roadway supply curve resulting from new road construction instead should 
have the effect indicated in Figure 3: While the cost of travel does decrease—from c0 to c1—the 
decrease will not be as large as it would be if in fact demand for travel were substantially inelastic 
to roadway supply. Moreover, unlike Figure 2, Figure 3 predicts that new road construction 
should result in an increase in traffic flow, from f0 to f1. 
 
FIGURE 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The phenomenon of induced travel has an even more pronounced effect over time. Logic 
suggests that new roadway construction might spur new land development—leading, for 
example, to more commuters or more businesses to which existing residents commute—and also 
might create incentives for current residents to purchase additional vehicles. In short, “long term 
responses to increased access can result in changes in land use patterns, possibly inducing both 
more and longer trips.”76 This could result in an upward shift in the travel demand curve over 
time, as reflected in Figure 4. With equilibrium now occurring at the intersection of average 
perceived cost APC1 and demand curve D2, some of the original reduction in cost of travel (from 
c0 to c1) are lost as the time-cost rises to c2. Further, traffic flow rises again, this time to level f2. 
                                                 
76 Fulton et al., supra note 42, at 3. On the links between land use, roadways, and congestion, see generally Rachel 
Weinberger, The High Cost of Free Freeways, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 475 (2007).  
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Moreover, depending upon the time-elasticity of demand to roadway capacity, the effect 
of induced travel could be even worse. Let’s say that, as reflected in Figure 5, induced travel over 
time shifts the demand curve not to D2, but rather to D3. Now, not only has traffic flow increased 
to f3, well above the original f0 level, but also the cost of travel is c3—higher than the c0 level that 
obtained before the new construction. In other words, congestion itself has worsened as a result of 
the new construction. 
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It is conceivable that the increase in growth that follows road construction is not the 
result of road construction. It is possible that the growth would have occurred anyway. If that is 
so, then the new road construction was simply an accurate anticipation of the growth—in which 
case society is better off with the new construction than it would be without it (since the growth 
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would have happened either way). But, although they are not conclusive, recent empirical studies 
generally suggest otherwise.77  
 
In sum, the phenomenon of induced travel appears to be an empirically accurate 
description of the response to new road construction: increased travel demand. As such, new road 
construction as a pure strategy in response to congestion seems questionable. And, depending 
upon the extent of elasticity of travel demand to roadway supply, such a pure strategy well may 
be quite ill advised—since it may function only to worsen the congestion problem over time.  
 
Even if new road construction is not a cost-effective way to address the problem of traffic 
congestion, it still remains a popular government response to the problem of congestion. Part of 
the popularity of the new road construction strategy may be due to urban planners’ erroneous 
belief that demand for travel was substantially inelastic to the time-cost of travel.78 But public 
choice theory offers another—seemingly stronger—reason for government’s emphasis on new 
road construction. 
 
Many societal actors—and, in particular, many societal actors who readily can form 
cohesive, power interest groups—are likely to support new road construction. First, even if 
economic theory suggests that new road construction may not be effective to combat congestion 
(and indeed even may worsen it), the fact remains that residents of an area that rely on a 
congested roadway for their travel needs will believe that the new construction will reduce 
congestion. Second, industry actors that engage in road construction, and real estate construction, 
will support such projects.79 The same is true for those employed in the road and real estate 
construction industries. And, since many of those employees are union members, organized labor 
is likely to support new road construction.  
 
In addition, new road construction is likely to be a financial boon to landowners, 
businesses, and developers. For example, the construction of an entirely new road is likely to 
increase land values along the path of the new road. This will likely lead to increased profits for 
                                                 
77 See Fulton et al., supra note 42, at 13 (noting that study results “[o]verall . . . provide a strong indication that 
growth in lane-miles is exogenous and therefore causes the growth in [vehicle-miles traveled]”); Robert B. Noland & 
William A. Cowart, Analysis of Metropolitan Highway Capacity and the Growth in Vehicle Miles of Travel, 27 
TRANSP. 363, 387 (2000) (study results “are highly suggestive of a causal linkage” between lane mile additions and 
growth in vehicle-miles traveled); Robert B. Noland, Relationships Between Highway Capacity and Induced Vehicle 
Travel, 35 TRANSP. RES. PART A 47, 70 (2001) (study results suggests “[o]verall . . . that . . . the induced travel effect is 
accounting for a quarter of . . . growth” in vehicle-miles traveled); cf. James Traub, Harvard Radical, N.Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE, Aug. 24, 2003, at 28, 32 (describing Harvard President and economist Lawrence Summers’ childhood 
recollection that, “if the family . . . was stuck in traffic, one of his parents [both of whom were economists] might ask, 
‘If there was one more lane, would that eliminate the traffic jam or simply increase the number of drivers who used the 
road?’”). But see Patricia L. Mokhtarian, Francisco J. Samaniego, Robert H. Shumway & Neil H. Willits, Revisiting the 
Notion of Induced Traffic Through a Matched-Pairs Study, 29 TRANSP. 193, 199, 214 (2002) (using “matched-pairs” 
technique (i.e., “comparing traffic growth on improved segments against growth on ‘similar’ unimproved (control) 
segments,” and “finding no evidence of induced [travel] demand”). That travel demand depends upon cost is 
demonstrated by the increase in New York City bus ridership following introduction of free transfers to buses from the 
subways. See Thomas J. Lueck, New York Bus Ridership Surges After Long Decline, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1998, at A2 
(identifying discounts as one reason for the surge in bus ridership). 
78 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text, and Fig. 2.  
79 Cf. William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 57, 80 (1999) (“Real estate and transportation construction interests have substantial monetary incentives to 
favor continued government expenditures on the highways . . . that are essential to urban sprawl.”); Oliver Houck, 
Unfinished Stories, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 867, 897-98 (2002) (describing the large industrial interests reliant upon heavy 
usage of the automobile). 
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business owners located along the new road, and also likely create work for land developers.80 
The same is likely to be true (though perhaps to a lesser degree) for the addition of new lanes to 
an existing roadway.  
 
Some societal actors may be opposed to a particular road construction project. For 
example, business owners along a trafficked highway may oppose the construction of an 
alternative highway route for fear that the reduction in traffic on the existing route will translate 
into lost profits.81 Environmental organizations and organizations that advocate land use planning 
also may oppose new road construction. But it seems likely that in many cases public choice 
theory would predict that the many powerful, well-organized special interests that support new 
road construction would far outweigh the few that oppose it. 
 
Government actors are also likely to support new road construction projects. New road 
construction has been described as the quintessential form of political pork.82 Politicians can 
increase their power base by doling out road construction projects.83 The public is also likely to 
appreciate the public spending as a boost to the local economy (especially if, as is often the case, 
the money used to finance the project is from a government level far removed from the local, 
especially the federal government). And, to the extent that, as noted above, constituents 
understand (even if erroneously) new road construction to ameliorate congestion, politicians can 
claim that they are doing something to address the problem of traffic congestion.  
 
When examined through the lens of David Mayhew’s reelection-focused approach to 
political actors,84 the propensity for government to back new road construction becomes even 
clearer. Mayhew argues that legislators are career politicians motivated substantially by a desire 
to be repeatedly reelected.85 Accordingly, he argues, “congressmen must constantly engage in 
activities related to reelection.”86 Among the activities that Mayhew identifies that further 
reelection prospects—and in which legislators therefore reasonably should be expected to 
engage—is “credit claiming,” i.e., “acting so as to generate a belief in a relevant political actor (or 
actors) that one is personally responsible for causing the government, or some unit thereof, to do 
something that the actor (or actors) considers desirable.”87  
 
Mayhew expounds that legislators most prevalently engage in credit claiming by doling 
out “particularized benefits,” which satisfy these conditions:  
 
                                                 
80 See, e.g., Peter T. Kilborn, In Rural Areas, Interstates Build Their Own Economy, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2001, at 
A1. 
81 This opposition may be tempered somewhat by the fact that the reduction in congestion on the original route may 
actually encourage some people to travel to, and patronize, the existing businesses. 
82 See, e.g., Robert Jay Dilger, TEA-21: Transportation Policy, Pork Barrel Politics, and American Federalism, 28 
PUBLIUS 49, 50 (1998); Michael Lyons, Political Self-Interest and U.S. Environmental Policy, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
271, 284 (1999); David H. Rosenbloom, 1946: Framing a Lasting Congressional Response to the Administrative State, 
50 ADMIN. L. REV. 173, 187 (1998). 
83 As Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum commented during the Senate debate over the then-pending SAFETEA 
highway bill, “Never get between a congressman and asphalt, because you will always get run over.” Christopher Lee, 
Highway Bill Passes Senate, Faces Opposition From Bush, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2004, at A4.  
84 See MAYHEW, supra note 14.  
85 See id. at 14-17.  
Mayhew formally restricts his argument to federal legislators, see id. at 13, 25, but his arguments in this regard 
readily translates in at least a fairly robust form to the setting of state and even local legislators today.  
86 Id. at 49. 
87 Id. at 52-53. Mayhew identifies two other activities that are likely to lead to reelection: “advertising,” see id. at 
49, and “position taking,” see id. at 61. 
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(1) Each benefit is given out to a specific individual, group, or geographical 
constituency, the recipient unit being of a scale that allows a single congressman 
to be recognized (by relevant political actors and other congressmen) as the 
claimant for the benefit (other congressmen being perceived as indifferent or 
hostile). (2) Each benefit is given out in apparently ad hoc fashion (unlike, say, 
social security checks) with a congressman apparently having a hand in the 
allocation.88 
 
Roadway construction projects provide a clear example of a particularized benefit. A 
roadway project benefits (or at least appears to benefit) specific individuals—both residents who 
believe that traffic congestion woes will be lessened, and road construction firms and workers, as 
well as the real estate construction and sales industries. And, since roadway construction projects 
are hardly handed out like social security checks, legislators credibly can claim (where 
appropriate) that they had a hand in their allocation. In short, the political popularity of highway 
construction projects is not surprising.  
 
In the end, the pure strategy of new road construction is not to be a cost-effective way to 
address the problem of traffic congestion; indeed, it may even be counterproductive in the long 
run. Nonetheless, public choice theory suggests that it is likely to remain a popular government 
response to the problem. 
 
V. THE EFFICIENT RESPONSE TO TRAFFIC CONGESTION: CONGESTION PRICING 
 
Congestion pricing is an efficient, market-based response to the problem of traffic 
congestion.89 In this Part, I present an overview of congestion pricing. First, I briefly summarize 
                                                 
88 Id. at 54. 
89 Market-based approaches to congestion control effectively assign a price to roadway access, and then rely upon 
prospective users to decide whether or not to pay the price and access the road. In this way, the scarce resource is 
allocated to those who value it most. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice 
in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 714-15 (1999). 
There are two possible market-based approaches other than congestion pricing. First, the converse of congestion 
pricing is a system that subsidizes travel during less congested periods: “The subsidy acts as a negative tax because 
failing to abate means incurring the cost of forgoing the subsidy.” Id. at 726. As such, “[s]ubsidies can in principle 
achieve cost-effective abatement.” Id.  
The Maryland Transportation Authority experimented with a subsidy-based approach to traffic congestion in 2003. 
The Authority proposed “to ease Friday afternoon backups for beachgoers at the Chesapeake Bay Bridge by getting 
private businesses to pay the tolls from 7 p.m. Fridays until 7 a.m. Saturdays.” Metro: No Takers for Tolls-for-Ads 
Plan, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2003, at B3. In exchange for the toll payments, a sponsoring business was offered the 
chance to “advertise[ ] at toll plazas, tollbooths and state traffic Web sites.” Id. Ultimately, only another branch of state 
government—the lottery agency—undertook sponsorship. See id.; Travel – Coming and Going: Road Trips Drive 
Time, WASH. POST, June 29, 2003, at P1 (noting that free eastbound passage across the bridge was to be available July 
4th, “courtesy of the Maryland Lottery”); Christian Davenport & Anita Huslin, Arundel Notebook: By All Means, Keep 
Traffic Moving, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2003, at T2.  
A more encompassing traffic subsidy proposal, also in the Washington metropolitan area, is one designed to reduce 
traffic across the Woodrow Wilson Bridge. The bridge, which spans the Potomac between Virginia and Washington, 
serves a major commuter artery. Under the program, dubbed “BridgeBucks,” participants will receive compensation for 
not taking the bridge. Steven Ginsburg, Plan to Pay Motorists to Get Off Bridge: Wilson Officials Hope to Ease Jams, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2004, at B1. To be eligible, “drivers must pass through part of the project corridor as they 
commute to work or school.” Id. Each participant will receive “the equivalent of $50 a month in the form of Metro 
passes or bus passes, or the money will be sent directly to vanpool operators to subsidize the riders’ fares.” Id. The 
program, which will last for at least one year, will be open to “the first 1,000 commuters who qualify, 500 from 
Virginia and 500 from Maryland,” and will involve “a first-year cost of about $745,000.” Id.  
Subsidy options are generally disfavored insofar as it seems normatively preferable to charge actors for engaging in 
an activity that imposes costs on others, rather than to pay actors not to engage in the activity. See Wiener, supra, at 
726. Analogizing to the setting of environmental law, a subsidy-based approach runs afoul of the “polluter pays” 
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the theoretical and practical history of congestion pricing. Second, I describe in the abstract the 
logic underlying a congestion charge system, and describe in the abstract how such systems can 
be structured; I identify two axes along which congestion pricing schemes might be categorized, 
and thus develop a typology of congestion pricing regimes. Next, I describe the current, limited 
federal role in fostering congestion pricing regimes. I then briefly survey existing congestion 
pricing regimes, both domestic and foreign.  
 
A. Brief History 
 
Problems of congestion in transportation were the subject of study of early neoclassical 
economists, seeking to shed light on the problem of market failure.90 Arsène Jules Étienne Dupuit 
undertook to determine the optimal toll for a bridge in 1844.91 The problem of roadway congested 
was investigated by both Arthur Cecil Pigou92 and Frank Knight93 in the 1920s. Both these 
“spiritual fathers of road pricing”94 recommended that drivers internalize the external congestion 
costs that they road usage imposed. Frank Plumpton Ramsey also advocated the use of taxes to 
address road congestion in 1927.95 
 
If Pigou and Knight are the “spiritual fathers” of congestion pricing, then Nobel Laureate 
William Vickrey was “the pioneer in [its] practical application.”96 Vickrey first suggested 
                                                                                                                                                 
principle, a normative notion that urges that pollution costs be borne by those who generate the pollution and associated 
harm. See generally Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution Allowances and 
the “Polluter Pays” Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 467-80 (2000) (discussing and analyzing various 
interpretations of the principle); cf. Kenneth J. Button & Erik T. Verhoef, Introduction, in ROAD PRICING, TRAFFIC 
CONGESTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT: ISSUES OF EFFICIENCY AND SOCIAL FEASIBILITY 3, at 4 (Kenneth J. Button & Erik 
T. Verhoef eds., 1998) [hereinafter “ROAD PRICING, TRAFFIC CONGESTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT”] (noting that 
environmental law’s “polluter pays principle” has its origins in early treatments of congestion pricing). Given the 
additional fact of the Maryland program’s inability to attract a sponsor other than another government agency, the 
future for noncongestion subsidy programs does not seem bright. But cf. supra text accompanying note 149 (describing 
FAIR lanes regimes as a hybrid between a congestion charge and subsidy system).  
One might also think of a third possible market-based response to the congestion problem: a tradable roadway 
access permit regime. See infra note 211 (describing a proposal that is somewhat similar to such a system). Congestion 
pricing is a price-control mechanism; the price-control analog to the congestion pricing would be a transferable road 
access permit system. Assuming similar instrument structure, that the market functions frictionlessly, and that the 
government’s access to information is perfect, both regimes should give rise to the same level of pollution and impose 
the same cost on polluters. See Wiener, supra, at 715.  
Four problems present design challenges for the implementation of a tradable roadway access permit regime. First, 
because a tradable roadway access permit scheme would cap the total number of vehicles allowed on a given road at a 
given time, it is possible that some people will simply be unable to purchase roadway access; at least with a congestion 
pricing scheme, newcomers have the option of paying the charge (even if it is high) and gaining access. Second, for 
what period of time would a roadway access permit remain valid? Third, where, how, and at what degree of difficulty 
and cost would people trade the permits? Fourth, how would the system be designed to confront the possibility of 
traffic “hot spots?” Cf. Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: Designing Marketable 
Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 569, 580 (2001) (discussing “hot spots” 
in the context of pollution). 
90 Button & Verhoef, supra note 89, at 4.  
91 J. Dupuit, On the Measurement of the Utility of Public Works, ANNALES DES PONTS ET CHAUSSÉES (vol. 8, 2d 
ser.) (1844), reprinted in TRANSPORT: SELECTED READINGS (D. Munby ed., 1968). 
92 See A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 163 (1920). 
93 See F. H. Knight, Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost, 38 Q.J. ECON. 582 (1924). 
94 Button & Verhoef, Introduction, supra note 89, at 4.  
95 See F. P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47, 59 (1927). 
96 Richard Arnott, Pricing Urban Transportation: Introduction, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS: SELECTED PAPERS BY 
WILLIAM VICKREY 271, 271 (Richard Arnott et al. eds., 1994). See also Wahrman, supra note 21, at 181 n.* (article 
dedicated to Vickrey, “an early and lonely champion of congestion pricing”). 
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congestion pricing in a study commissioned to revamp the New York City subway system.97 He 
then recommended the use of congestion pricing in the Washington, D.C. area,98 testifying before 
Congress on the matter in 1958.99 In the ensuing decades, he would write numerous articles 
advocating the use of congestion pricing regimes, and explaining how they could practically be 
implemented.100 
 
Despite Vickrey’s longstanding and strenuous support, congestion pricing remained a 
theoretical construct for many years. The successful implementation of a congestion pricing 
program in Singapore in the mid-1970s spurred Congress, finally, in 1990 to authorize pilot 
congestion pricing programs in the United States.101 Even now, however, congestion pricing 
regimes remain clearly the exception rather than the rule. 
 
B. Fundamental Logic and Typology 
 
Congestion pricing is a species of road pricing. “Road pricing refers to charging for the 
direct use of the road.”102 Fees may be placed on road access for a variety reasons—including 
recovery of the cost of constructing the road, recovery of the costs of maintaining and upgrading 
the road,103 to subsidize mass transportation,104 or simply as a source of government revenue.105 
Congestion charging envisions the imposition of fees solely as “an instrument to manage travel 
                                                 
97 See WILLIAM S. VICKREY, THE REVISION OF THE RAPID TRANSIT FARE STRUCTURE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 
(1952).  
98 See Arnott, supra note 96, at 272. 
99 See Strahilevitz, supra note 58, at 1249; Wahrman, supra note 21, at 182 n.5.  
100 See, e.g., Arnott, supra note 96, at 272-75. 
101 Strahilevitz, supra note 58, at 1249. I describe the federal role in spurring the development of congestion pricing 
regimes below. See infra Part V.C.  
102 Johansson & Mattsson, supra note 29, at 7. Road pricing itself is a subspecies of the broader category of road 
user charges—that is, the “spectrum of methods to collect money from road users, e.g. gasoline and vehicle ownership 
taxes.” Id.  
103 For example, on the New Jersey Turnpike, “[t]olls for travels between interchanges are determined by the cost of 
construction and maintenance between those points.” New Jersey Turnpike Authority, Welcome to the New Jersey 
Turnpike: A Brief Tour … 6 (available at www.state.nj.us/turnpike/tpbook.pdf (visited Aug. 30, 2003)); see id. at 9-10 
(section entitled “Your Tolls at Work” that describes projects financed by tolls that have been undertaken to improve 
the Turnpike). 
Note that, effective July 9, 2003, the New Jersey Highway Authority (which administered New Jersey’s Garden 
State Parkway) was folded into the New Jersey Turnpike Authority. See N.J. P.L. 2003 c. 79 (May 27, 2003); 
www.gspkwy.state.nj.us/ (visited Aug. 30, 2003). A press release from New Jersey’s governor proclaims that, as a 
result, “more money is now available for projects to improve the roads.” www.state.nj.us/turnpike/msgfromgov.htm 
(visited Aug. 30, 2003). 
104 For example, New York’s MTA Bridges and Tunnels (“B&T”) is a “constituent agency of the Metropolitan 
Transportation Authority.” MTA, Welcome to MTA Bridges and Tunnels, www.mta.nyc.ny.us/bandt/html/btintro.htm 
(visited Dec. 3, 2005). B&T’s “dual role is to operate seven bridges and two tunnels and to provide surplus toll 
revenues to help support public transit.” Id. The cross-subsidization of public transit with bridge and tunnel tolls dates 
back to the 1960s:  
By the 1960s the city was becoming choked by automobile congestion and pollution, and the need to 
restore long neglected subway, bus, and commuter rail systems became apparent. Accordingly, in 1968 the 
Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority was made part of the MTA. Its surplus revenues, previously used to 
finance new projects for the automobile, were redirected to public transportation. Since that time, bridge and 
tunnel tolls have contributed more than $5.6 billion to subsidize fares and underwrite capital improvements 
for New York City Transit, the Long Island Rail Road, and the Metro-North Railroad. Total toll revenues, 
more than $750 million annually, and Bridges and Tunnels’ Five Year Capital Program will keep its facilities 
among the best maintained in the region.  
Id.  
105 E.g., MCGILLIVRAY, supra note 46, at 1 (“Through most of history the justification for [toll charges] has been 
either to generate income or profit or to pay the costs of providing a facility which smooth[e]s the way for passage.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
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demand and guide/control traffic flows.” 106 Congestion pricing schemes are generally designed to 
mandate the internalization of the congestion externality.107  
 
Congestion pricing regimes seek to remedy the externality of congestion in a 
straightforward way—by charging drivers for access to the roadways at issue.108 As I explain 
below, this seemingly simply definition harbors considerable ambiguity—ambiguity that affords 
freedom in designing congestion pricing schemes—but the fundamental point remains that 
congestion pricing regimes seek to mitigate the externality by directly requiring cost 
internalization.  
 
The use of congestion pricing regimes for roadway use is similar to the use of peak 
pricing regimes with which consumers are already familiar for other goods and services.109 The 
benefits of application of peak pricing to roadway access are clear: “Congestion pricing assesses 
vehicles for the congestion and the time losses they impose on other roadway users. In doing so, 
congestion pricing can dampen and flatten the demand to use roads, thereby reducing the 
aggregate loss of drivers’ time and also defraying the need to expand road capacity.”110 In 
addition, congestion pricing “not only sends out the right signals to motorists but it yields a 
transfer of resources that could be used by the road authority to enhance community welfare.”111 
Also, unlike command-and-control approaches,112 congestion pricing regimes afford societal 
actors maximum flexibility in determining their travel itineraries.113  
 
Congestion pricing structures can be seen to vary along two axes. First, one must 
determine how the price for road access is determined.114 Second, one must examine what other 
                                                 
106 See Johansson & Mattsson, supra note 29, at 7-8 (“When road pricing is used as an instrument to manage travel 
demand and guide/control traffic flows it is called congestion pricing.”). To the extent that a fee is imposed for more 
than one reason, I refer to the fee as a “congestion charge” only to the extent that it is imposed to effect internalization 
of the congestion externality. 
107 See id. at 8 (“Road pricing is often introduced as a method to internalise the externalities generated by road use, 
thereby removing the external effects caused by car drivers. The charges are directed towards the congestion and other 
road damage externalities caused by motorists.”). 
108 See, e.g., Strahilevitz, supra note 58, at 1235 (concisely defining “congestion pricing” as “an approach that seeks 
to decrease congestion by charging motorists tolls that vary based on the levels of traffic congestion at a given time”). 
109 See id. at 1244; Komanoff, supra note 60, at 132. For a theoretical overview of peak pricing, see W. KIP 
VISCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON & JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 396-403 (2d 
ed.1998).  
110 Komanoff, supra note 60, at 131. 
111 Timothy D. Hau, Instruments for Charging Congestion Externalities, in ROAD PRICING, supra note 29, at 223, 
224.  
112 See infra text accompanying note 226.  
113 Harry Richardson & Chang-Hee Bae explain that the options among which individuals may choose under a 
congestion pricing regime include: 
no change in travel behavior (that is, paying the charges); increasing travel (because trip times on formerly 
congested roads are now reduced); unchanged travel behavior combined with attempts to reduce total 
automobile costs (for example, keeping vehicle longer, or replacing it with a cheaper or more fuel-efficient 
vehicle); changing travel behavior with the same level of tripmaking (for example, changing trip time, route, 
or mode, such as carpools, transit); reduce tripmaking (for example, trip chaining, telecommuting, or simply 
traveling less); and changes in location (for example, residence, workplace shopping destination). 
Harry W. Richardson & Chang-Hee Christine Bae, The Equity Impacts of Road Congestion Pricing, in ROAD PRICING, 
TRAFFIC CONGESTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 89, at 247, 247-48.  
114 Peter Jones breaks the pricing question down into finer distinctions: 
1. Who should be charged? 
2. How much should they pay? 
3. Where should they be charged? 
4. When should they be charged? 
5. How should they be charged? 
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options—i.e., substitutes—are available to persons who choose not to pay for road access, and 
how those options are priced.  
 
An understanding of how congestion pricing should theoretically be set is not difficult. 
As shown in Figure 1 above, the congestion externality arises because of a discrepancy between 
the “average perceived costs” faced by motorists and the total “marginal costs” to which driving 
gives rise. It is appropriate to impose a congestion charge sufficient to ensure that drivers in fact 
take into account the actual total marginal costs. This means that congestion charges should be set 
equal to the excess of marginal costs over average perceived costs.115 Since the purpose of 
congestion pricing is to internalize the congestion externality, a congestion pricing scheme should 
impose no charge where there is no congestion.116 Congestion has a “collective (social) effect” 
where “marginal social cost is higher and increases faster than the average individual cost.”117 
 
A pure congestion pricing system would take into account the existing traffic conditions 
and how the new entrant’s travel will adversely affect traffic conditions. In theory, then, a 
congestion pricing scheme should vary price according to the extent to which, on a going-forward 
basis, the new entrant’s driving contributes to congestion. Thus, under the pure approach, the total 
cost of a trip should depend upon changing traffic conditions during the trip. There is a practical 
problem here: The total cost of the trip could not be determined in advance. But part of the 
benefit offered by congestion pricing is that prospective roadway users might consider congestion 
cost associated with a trip in advance. In this sense, it is preferable if the congestion pricing 
scheme sets a fixed price in advance of the trip.118 Thus, practicality may require sacrifice of 
some of the purity of a congestion pricing regime.119 
 
 In order to allow for the establishment of a fixed price for a trip, a congestion pricing 
scheme can use historical data on traffic patterns to anticipate the externalized cost that one 
                                                                                                                                                 
Peter Jones, Urban Road Pricing: Public Acceptability and Barriers to Implementation, in ROAD PRICING, TRAFFIC 
CONGESTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 89, at 263, 277; see id. at 277-80. 
115 See Johansson & Mattsson, supra note 29, at 13; Hau, supra note 32, at 58 (“It is th[e] amount of external 
congestion cost – or time cost expressed in money terms – that the government ought to charge for. The marginal 
external cost is the difference between the (short-run) marginal cost and the average (variable) cost of a trip.” 
(emphasis in original; footnote omitted)). But see Komanoff, supra note 60, at 132-33 (arguing that, because “the 
objective is not necessarily to eliminate all congestion, but to maximize the net benefits from society’s economic 
resources, including not only time but capital invested in roads[,], . . . the “appropriate level of congestion pricing is 
probably far less” than total external congestion costs (footnote omitted)); Phil B. Goodwin, Road Pricing or Transport 
Planning?, in ROAD PRICING, supra note 29, at 143, 149 (arguing that, while congestion pricing regimes are in general 
a good idea, actually imposing internalization of congestion costs might not be optimal). 
116 See Johansson & Mattsson, supra note 29, at 10-11 (Where “there are no congestion effects . . . there are no 
efficiency or welfare arguments” in favor of imposing a charge.); Komanoff, supra note 60, at 132 (“Motorists using 
uncongested rural roads would not pay congestion fees.”).  
117 Johansson & Mattsson, supra note 29, at 11. 
118 Note, however, that other variable costs, such as gasoline, oil, and general vehicle wear-and-tear, may vary 
considerably depending upon traffic conditions. To that extent, drivers often may be forced to decide whether or not to 
undertake a trip (or to use a particular route) without full knowledge of the total cost of the trip. 
119 Phil Goodwin explicates: 
[T]here is a balance between theoretical purity and practical usefulness. In principle, the road pricing 
argument can be extended to show that a vehicle at the front of a queue should be charged more than one at 
the back, and that charging rates should vary by the minute, or even [the] second, in response to the 
constantly changing intrusiveness of traffic in urban streets. In practice, there is a limit to how finely it is 
useful to specify charges – and indeed a strong argument that charges should be predictable, and known to 
the motorist before a journey is started. The result is that most road pricing exercises plan some sort of 
simplified system where charges vary by period of the day, and by geographical area or part of the network, 
but in rather broad bands which therefore necessarily average out some of the potential refinements, and lose 
the moral high ground of a theoretical optimum. 
Goodwin, supra note 115, at 148. 
Economic Efficiency versus Public Choice 25
would expect the new entrant’s travel to generate. In this sense, setting a congestion charge 
presents an easier chore for a regulator than the task of setting a Pigouvian tax in most other 
settings.  
 
But reliance upon historical data does not resolve the pricing issue. In order properly to 
price a trip, the congestion pricing scheme should take into account some aspect of the traveler’s 
journey. There are several ways that this can be achieved. First, the driver somehow might 
indicate his anticipated route in advance of his trip120; a problem arises, however, if the driver 
changes his or her path en route.  
 
Second, the congestion pricing scheme might use distance traveled as a measure of 
contribution to congestion. Such an approach might entail the system recording the locations at 
which a driver enters and exits the road subject to pricing, and then pricing the trip according to 
that information.121 The approach also could be achieved by having a device that measures actual 
distances traveled on the restricted road122; data from that device would be obtained by the 
government and used to price the roadway usage. 
 
A third possibility would be to use time spent on a road as a proxy for contribution to 
congestion on the road. Here, the system would record the times at which a driver enters and exits 
the restricted road. 
 
Each of these possibilities requires the government to obtain data in respect of each 
driver’s trip on each occasion that the driver takes a trip. While technological advances make 
these possibilities far more feasible than they previously were,123 nonetheless they remain 
complex and somewhat costly. Other options exist that are less complex and costly, although they 
require sacrifice of accuracy in pricing to achieve those ends. 
 
First, a congestion pricing scheme can be simplified by charging a uniform price for use 
of the road—i.e., by charging on a per use basis, without regard to distance traveled or time spent 
on the road. To the extent that the pricing system is designed to address congestion, the system 
still would take into account somehow the extent to which a new entrant contributes to existing 
congestion conditions. Presumably, such a system would charge all drivers the average 
congestion price. One might expect, therefore, that drivers of shorter trips would subsidize drivers 
of longer trips under such a system, with the possible result that short-trip drivers would avoid the 
road and long-trip drivers would overuse it. Such a distortion might result in inefficiently high 
                                                 
120 This would be akin to a “flight plan” filed by a pilot. 
121 Many state toll roads employ pricing systems that, while not congestion pricing schemes, vary tolls according to 
the entrance and exit used by drivers. See supra note 103 (discussing the setting of tolls on the New Jersey Turnpike). 
122 See KIRAN BHATT, ROAD PRICING TECHNOLOGIES: A SURVEY (1974). Such a device would be akin to a meter 
used by taxicabs in many metropolitan areas.  
123 Compare id. at 7-20 (surveying then-existing technological options) and Goetz, supra note 63, at 118 
(describing road pricing on trunk highways as “feasible” but pricing city streets as “impractical” “[g]iven the present 
technology,” but also noting that “it is not impossible to imagine the development of electronic monitoring devices that 
would bring almost-universal road-usage pricing within the realm of practicality”) with Wahrman, supra note 21, at 
196 (“It is only recently that the concept [of congestion pricing] became administratively feasible with the introduction 
of electronic tolls and computerized toll cards.”); cf. EMMERINK, supra note 64, at 45 (Although “the costs of 
implementing and maintaining a congestion-pricing system should not be underestimated,” “recent evidence indicated 
that, for high density, highly congested regions, these may be relatively low.”). See also DANIEL H. COLE, PROPERTY 
AND POLLUTION ch. 4 (2002) (discussing the relationship between technology capabilities and design and development 
of environmental regulatory tools); Nash & Revesz, supra note 89, at 637-50 (describing how computerized pollution 
dispersion models and the internet can facilitate more nuanced air pollutant permit trading programs).. For a discussion 
of the ethical implications of scientific innovation on environmental policy, see Carol M. Rose, Scientific Innovation 
and Environmental Protection: Some Ethical Considerations, 32 ENVTL. L. 755 (2002). 
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congestion levels (at least in the short-term, until pricing caught up with the changed use of the 
road). In other words, true pricing might lead to adverse selection of roadway users.  
 
Another simplifying step is to use the time of day as a proxy for congestion conditions, 
without regard to what actual congestion conditions are at any given moment.124 The most 
common version seen in congestion pricing scheme is simply to price roadway access at a higher 
rate during prevalent “rush hours.” For example, the government might charge a higher toll from 
6:00 to 10:00 every weekday morning into a city, and from 4:00 to 8:00 every weekday evening 
out of the city.125 Indeed, the city might charge no toll in non-peak hours. For example, the city of 
London has recently implemented a congestion pricing scheme for permission to drive in the 
central city. The scheme imposes a flat fee for access to the central city during the hours of 
7:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. on weekdays; no fee is required during other hours.126 
 
The second axis along which congestion pricing schemes can be measured is the 
availability, and pricing, of substitutes. It is possible for all viable substitutes for a congestion-
priced road to be themselves subject to congestion pricing (or to some other form of tolls); in the 
alternative, it is possible for substitute roads (or public transit) to be offered at no cost. This 
distinction can be used to divide congestion pricing regimes into two categories: regimes that 
charge for access to particular roads or lanes on a road, and regimes that charge for access to a 
particular region regardless of the route taken, the latter being known commonly as “cordon-
pricing” regimes. 
 
The recently enacted congestion pricing regime in London is an example of cordon-
pricing. Those who choose not to pay for access to the central city during the day have the option 
of using public transit—which is less expensive, but not free.127 While some London workers 
have complained that their circumstances leave them with no viable substitute to paying the 
                                                 
124 The idea of using historical congestion data is a more nuanced version of this simplifying step. See supra text 
accompanying notes 118-199.  
125 In the public transit context, the “Metrorail” subway system in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area charges 
higher fees for travel during morning and evening rush hours. See  
www.wmata.com/riding/hours_fares.cfm#Metrorail%20Fares (visited Sept. 19, 2007). William Vickrey originally 
advocated congestion pricing for use in public transportation—specifically, the New York City subway system. See 
supra text accompanying note 97. Cf. Patrick Healy, Rises in Fares and Costs Give Cabbies Mixed Feelings, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 3, 2004, at B3 (“Riders [in taxis] will . . . have to pay a new $1 surcharge from 4 p.m. to 8 p.m. weekdays, 
a fee intended to draw out more cabs during rush hour.”).  
126 Transport for London, Congestion charging . . . where and when does it operate?, 
www.cclondon.com/infosearch/dynamicPages/WF_ZoneCheck_W.aspx (visited Sept. 19, 2007). Exemptions and 
discounts are available for, among others, residents of the central city, disabled persons, vehicles that seat nine or more, 
and alternative fuel vehicles. See Transport for London, Congestion Charging . . . Exemptions and Discounts, 
www.cclondon.com/exemptions.shtml (visited Sept. 19, 2007).  
On the London congestion charge plan generally, see MARTIN RICHARDS, CONGESTION CHARGING IN LONDON: THE 
POLICY AND THE POLITICS (2005).  
127 Public transit is also not a perfect substitute for roadway access. See Oren, supra note 31, at 212-31 (discussing 
the importance to Americans of driving vehicles, and surveying how that ideal has frustrated attempts to change driving 
patterns through behavioral modification).  
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central city access fee,128 overall the London plan seems to be faring reasonably well and even 
earning some public accolades.129  
 
The alternative to a cordon-pricing regime is the category of regimes for which vehicles 
must pay for access to a particular roadway or lanes on a roadway; substitutes—in the form of 
alternate roadways or other lanes—are available at no cost (and sometimes, as I discuss below, 
even subsidized130). For example, the San Diego I-15 “FasTrak” pricing scheme charges single-
occupant vehicles for access to the road’s express lanes.131 But access to the highway’s local 
lanes remains free.  
 
Regimes that fall under this category may further be broken down into subcategories. A 
simple example is a regime that charges drivers for access to a particular roadway. Another 
simple example is a regime that charges drivers for access to particular lanes on a roadway. Often 
these lanes will be “express lanes” that bypass numerous exits, allowing users of the charged 
lanes to avoid the additional traffic, and entrance and exit ramps that numerous exits generate. 
Along similar lines, access for lanes may be priced where the lanes are designed to avoid areas 
along the primary roadway where the free lanes suffer bottleneck conditions.132  
 
A hybridization of lane-access pricing occurs where lane access is also permitted to 
particular vehicles on a basis other than cost. An example of this is “HOT lanes” systems. 
 
“HOT” is the acronym for “High Occupancy/Toll.” On HOT lanes, low 
occupancy vehicles are charged a toll, while High-Occupancy Vehicles (HOVs) 
are allowed to use the lanes free or at a discounted toll rate. HOT lanes create an 
additional category of eligibility for people wanting to use HOV lanes. People 
can either meet the minimum vehicle passenger requirement, or they can choose 
to pay a toll to gain access to the HOV lane.133 
 
The San Diego “FasTrak” system is an example of a HOT lanes regime. Interest in such regimes 
is growing. 
 
Yet another variant on lane-pricing access is a “FAIR lanes” regime. 
 
“Fast and Intertwined Regular Lanes” or “FAIR lanes” involves separating 
freeway lanes, typically using plastic pylons and striping, into two sections: 
“fast” lanes and “regular” lanes. The fast lanes would be electronically tolled 
express lanes where tolls may change dynamically to manage demand. In the 
                                                 
128 For example, workers at a London meat market had argued that they ought not to have to pay the congestion toll 
“because they come to the market in the middle of the night and go home by midmorning. When their day starts [at] 
around 3 a.m., they say, little public transportation is available.” London Institutes Its New Anti-Gridlock Toll; Few 
Problems are Reported on First Day, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 18, 2003, at A8. The workers contemplated filing 
a lawsuit challenging the imposition of the toll, but ultimately agreed not to in return for “assurances given by Ken 
Livingstone, the Mayor of London, that he would consider introducing a cheaper rate for drivers on low incomes.” Ben 
Webster, Workers Abandon Charge Challenge, THE TIMES OF LONDON, Feb. 22, 2003, at 14.  
129 See, e.g., Jill Lawless, Supporters, Foes Agree: London Traffic Fee Works, N.O. TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 18, 
2003, at A23.  
130 See infra text accompanying notes 134-136 (discussion of “FAIR lanes”).  
131 Vehicles with two or more occupants may use the express lanes at no charge.  
132 See Federal Highway Administration, Terminology (available at  
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/otps/terminology.htm (last modified Sept. 21, 2005)) (“Queue jumps are roadway 
facilities that can be used by drivers paying a toll to bypass points on the transportation network where congestion is 
typically severe (colloquially, a ‘bottleneck’).”). 
133 Id.  
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regular lanes, constricted flow would continue, but drivers with transponders 
would be compensated with credits. Credits could be used as toll payments on 
days when they choose to use the fast lanes, or as payment for transit, paratransit 
or parking at commuter park-and-ride lots in the corridor.134 
 
FAIR lanes thus are a hybrid between pure congestion pricing and subsidy regimes.135 The 
incorporation of a subsidy element may provide an opportunity to ameliorate what some perceive 
to be equity shortcomings in standard congestion pricing regimes.136 
 
C. Current Federal Role in Fostering Congestion Pricing Regimes 
 
Public money to construct roads comes from the federal government, as well as from 
state governments.137 The “federal-aid highway program” (“FAHP”) is the primary federal source 
of funds for highway construction.138 It is administered by the Department of Transportation’s 
Federal Highway Administration.139 The FAHP is “basically a federally funded state program.”140 
“Monies for the federal-aid highway system are provided primarily by the Federal Highway Trust 
Fund, fueled by taxes on gasoline, motor vehicles, and automotive parts.”141 The FAHP provides 
federal funding to roads within the “federal-aid systems.”142 The two federal-aid systems are the 
“Interstate System”143 and the “National Highway System,”144 of which the Interstate System is a 
component.145 
 
In fact, the Interstate System constitutes a very small part of all roads—only 4.9 percent 
of all federally subsidized roadway miles, and only 1.2 percent of all total roadway miles in the 
United States.146 Still, though Interstate Highways may constitute a relatively small proportion of 
                                                 
134 Id.  
135 I discuss the use of subsidies to reduce traffic congestion below, see supra note 89.  
136 See infra notes 210-213, 224, and accompanying text (discussing equity in the context of congestion pricing); 
see also supra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.  
137 See, e.g., David R. Fiore & John M. Stafford, Intermodal Transportation Planning for the Environment: Social, 
Cultural, and Economic Considerations for an Interdisciplinary Solution for Change, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 237, 251 n.36 
(1995). 
138 Edward V.A. Kussy, Wetland and Floodplain Protection and the Federal-Aid Highway Program, 13 ENVTL. L. 
161, 164 (1982). See id. (“Although the FAHP represents a relatively small portion of the total highway construction 
effort, it is still of enormous significance. It is one of the largest and most costly federal construction grant programs.”). 
139 Id.  
140 Id.  
141 Houck, supra note 79, at 897 n.176. See also Fiore & Stafford, supra note 137, at 251 n.36 (1995) (“In FY 1991, 
the Federal Highway Trust Fund net receipts for motor fuel constituted more than eighty-eight percent of all revenue 
sources. . . . States similarly depend largely on motor fuel receipts for state and federal highway projects that have 
matching shares requirements.” (citation omitted)). 
142 See 23 U.S.C. § 103(a) (defining the “Federal-aid systems); 47 C.F.R. § 470.103 (same). See also 23 U.S.C. 
§ 101(a)(5) (“The term ‘Federal-aid highway’ means a highway eligible for assistance under this chapter other than a 
highway classified as a local road or rural minor collector.”); 23 C.F.R. § 470.103 (“Federal aid highways means 
highways on the Federal-aid highway systems and all other public roads not classified as local roads or rural minor 
collectors.”). 
143 For the definition of the “Interstate System,” see 23 U.S.C. § 103(c); 47 C.F.R. § 470.107(a); see also 47 C.F.R. 
§ 470.111 (procedures governing the Interstate System). For an overview of the Interstate System, see Federal Highway 
Administration, Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways, available at 
www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/interstate.html (visited Dec. 3, 2005).  
144 For the definition of the “National Highway System,” see 23 U.S.C. § 103(b); 47 C.F.R. § 470.107(b); see also 
47 C.F.R. § 470.113 (procedures governing the National Highway System).  
145 23 U.S.C. § 103(b)(2)(A) (defining the National Highway System to include the Interstate System; 47 C.F.R. 
§ 470.107(b)(1) (same).  
146 As of October 2002, there were 3,981,670 miles of roads in the United States. See Federal Highway 
Administration, Public Road Length – 2002: Miles by Ownership and Federal-Aid Highways National Summary 
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all roads—and even of all roads in the National Highway System—they represent a far greater 
portion of the nation’s transportation road network than their total mileage might suggest. This is 
because of the role that the Interstate Highway system is designed to fulfill: Interstate Highways 
are to be “located so as . . . to connect by routes, as direct as practicable, the principal 
metropolitan areas, cities, and industrial centers.”147 These well-maintained roads carry an 
inordinate amount of traffic for the mileage they represent.  
 
Federal law imposes various restrictions on roads that receive federal funding. Among 
them is a restriction on the implementation and maintenance of tolls. The existing structure of 
federal law, under Title 23 of the United States Code, is quite hostile to the imposition of tolls—
of any kind—on interstate highways. Section 301 announces a general rule that bars tolls from 
roads that are constructed with federal highway funds.148 The section’s caption suggests the 
seriousness with which Congress—presumably in response to perceptions of, if not actual, public 
opinion—views the subject: “Freedom from tolls.”149 
 
Despite the breadth of its language and the audacity of its caption, section 301 subjects its 
toll preclusion rule to the provisions of section 129.150 And that section provides a fairly broad 
exception to section 301’s general rule.151 Though it preserves section 301’s general proscription 
against tolls with respect to highways constituting part of the interstate system, it otherwise 
permits the provision of federal funds for toll roads, and does not disallow the introduction of 
tolls on roads receiving federal funding.152 The provision grandfathers in existing toll segments of 
the interstate system, allowing for funding for “reconstructing, resurfacing, restoring, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
(available at www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/ohim/hs02/pdf/hm16.pdf) (visited Dec. 3, 2005). Of that, 3,079,758 miles are in 
rural areas while 901,912 were in urban areas (183,502 in small urban areas and 718,410 in urbanized areas). Id. Of the 
total 3,981,670 miles of roads, only 959,324 miles worth of road—i.e., just over 24 percent of roadway miles—
received FAHP funding. Id. Of those 959,324 subsidized roadway miles, only 161,539—or 16.8 percent—are part of 
the National Highway System. Id. The Interstate Highway System consists of 46,748 miles of road, which constitutes 
28.9 percent of the National Highway System, only 4.9 percent of all federally subsidized roadway miles, and only 1.2 
percent of all total roadway miles in the United States. Id.  
By comparison, based on 1979 statistics, 
The total mileage of all roads and streets in the United States is 3,957,819. Of these, 3,223,710 miles are in 
rural areas, while 693,786 miles are in municipal areas. Of this total mileage, only 824,832 miles (or 21%) 
were funded through the FAHP . . . . The interstate system has 42,894 miles, which is 14% of the primary 
system, 5% of the federal-aid system, and only 1% of all roads in the United States.  
Kussy, supra note 138, at 164 n.5 (citing FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., HIGHWAY STATISTICS—1979 
(1980)). 
147 23 U.S.C. § 103(c)(1)(C)(i). The statute directs that Interstate Highways are also to be located so as to “serve the 
national defense,” id. § 103(c)(1)(C)(ii), and so as, “to the maximum extent practicable, to connect at suitable border 
points with routes of continental importance in Canada and Mexico,” id. § 103(c)(1)(C)(iii). 
148 The provision states: “Except as provided in section 129 of this title with respect to certain toll bridges and toll 
tunnels, all highways constructed under the provisions of this title shall be free from tolls of all kinds.” 23 U.S.C. 
§ 301.  
149 Id.  
150 Id. (subjecting the bar against tolls to “section 129 of this title with respect to certain toll bridges and toll 
tunnels”).  
151 See id. § 129. The exception to the bar against tolls developed over time: 
The Federal-aid highway program, when created in 1916, allowed no use of Federal-aid funds on toll 
facilities. This position remained unchanged until 1927 when Congress enacted legislation that permitted 
Federal-aid highway funding to be used to construct toll bridges and approaches. Subsequent legislation 
provided more flexibility on using Federal-aid highway funds for improvements to toll facilities with the last 
significant changes being made in 1991 with passage of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act 
of 1991.  
Federal Highway Administration, Federal-Aid Highway Toll Facilities, available at  
www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/tollfac.html (visited Dec. 3, 2005).  
152 See 23 U.S.C. § 129(a)(1); id. § 129(a)(2)-(5) (setting forth restrictions on funding).  
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rehabilitating” such segments.153 As a result, “[a]pproximately 2,900 miles of toll facilities are 
included in the 46,730-mile [Interstate] System.”154 But, until 1991, federal law precluded the 
introduction of new tolls are the Interstate System. 
 
The first crack in the statutory bar against new Interstate System tolls was introduced by 
the 1991 passage of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act155 (ISTEA). Section 
1012(b) of ISTEA, captioned “Congestion Pricing Pilot Program,” directed the Department of 
Transportation to “solicit the participation of State and local governments and public authorities 
for one or more congestion pricing pilot projects,”156 and authorized the Department to approve 
up to five such projects.157 ISTEA further authorized the introduction of new tolls segments on 
Interstate Highways in respect of three of the pilot projects.158 
 
The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century159 (“TEA-21”) amended ISTEA’s 
“congestion pricing pilot project” provisions. First, TEA-21 replaced the moniker “congestion 
pricing pilot project” with “value pricing pilot programs.160 On a substantive level, TEA-21 
increased the maximum number of value pricing pilot programs from five to fifteen.161 The law 
also extended the suspension of sections 129 and 301’s bar against new tolls on Interstate 
Highways to apply not just to three pilot programs, but to all of them.162 
                                                 
153 See id. § 129(a)(1)(B).  
Although the Interstate System is free of tolls for the most part, Congress decided in 1956 to include 
some toll facilities in the System. Generally, these were major toll roads built or planned before Federal 
funding for construction of the Interstate System increased significantly in 1956. Inclusion of these toll roads 
in the Interstate System enhanced connectivity without having to build competing free routes in the same 
transportation corridors. Additionally, including these toll segments freed highway user tax revenues to 
develop other non-toll segments of the System sooner. 
Federal Highway Administration, supra note 151.  
154 Federal Highway Administration, supra note 151. For a catalog of toll and non-toll roads, bridges, tunnels, and 
ferries in the United States, see FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 20. For a list of toll bridges and 
tunnels that are part of the interstate highway system, see id. at 3. For a list of toll bridges and tunnels outside the 
interstate highway system, see id. at 4-8. For a list of toll roads that are part of the interstate highway system, see id. at 
9-12. For a list of toll roads outside the interstate highway system, see id. at 13-16.  
155 Pub. L. 102-240, 105 Stat. 1914 (Dec. 18, 1991) (codified, as amended, at 23 U.S.C. §§ 100-501). 
156 ISTEA § 1012(b)(1), 105 Stat. at 1938. 
157 Id. (“The Secretary [of Transportation] may enter into cooperative agreements with as many as 5 . . . State or 
local governments or public authorities to establish, maintain, and monitor congestion pricing projects.”). 
158 Id. § 1012(b)(4), 105 Stat. at 1938 (“Notwithstanding section 129 and 301 of title 23, United States Code, the 
Secretary [of Transportation] shall allow the use of tolls on the Interstate System as part of a pilot program under this 
section, but not on more than 3 of such programs.” (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 149 note).); see also id. § 1012(b)(2), 105 
Stat. at 1938 (“Notwithstanding section 129 of title 23, United States Code, the Federal share payable for such [pilot] 
programs shall be 80 percent.”). 
159 Pub. L. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107 (June 9, 1998). 
160 TEA-21 § 1216(a)(1)(B)(i), (ii), 112 Stat. at 211 (“Section 1012(b) of [ISTEA] . . . is amended . . . (B) in 
paragraph (1)—(i) by striking ‘congestion’ each place it appears and inserting ‘value’; and (ii) by striking ‘projects’ 
each time it appears and inserting ‘programs’ . . . .”); see also id. § 1216(a)(1)(A), 112 Stat. at 211 (changing the 
subsection 1012(b)’s heading from “CONGESTION PRICING PILOT PROGRAM” to “VALUE PRICING PILOT 
PROGRAM”); Office of Transportation Policy Studies, Value Pricing Pilot Program, 
www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/otps/valuepricing.htm (last modified Mar. 14, 2006) (The Value Pricing Pilot Program 
“replaces the Congestion Pricing Pilot Program that was authorized by the Intermodal Surface Transportation 
Efficiency Act of 1991.”).  
161 TEA-21 § 1216(a)(2), 112 Stat. at 211 (“Section 1012(b)(1) of [ISTEA] is amended in the second sentence by 
striking ‘5’ and inserting ‘15’.”). 
162 Id. § 1216(a)(4), 112 Stat. at 211 (“Section 1012(b)(4) of [ISTEA] is amended by striking ‘a pilot program under 
this section, but not on more than 3 of such programs’ and inserting ‘any value pricing pilot program under this 
subsection’.”).  
Beyond the value pricing pilot programs, TEA-21 created the Interstate System reconstruction rehabilitation pilot 
program, a limited program that allows for the introduction of new tolls on Interstate Highways “for the purpose of 
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Importantly, TEA-21 also expanded the possible purview of value pricing pilot programs 
by allowing them to make use of high-occupancy vehicle (“HOV”) lanes. Federal law authorizes 
“[a] State agency that has jurisdiction over the operation of a HOV facility shall establish the 
occupancy requirements of vehicles operating on the facility,”163 but also directs that, “[e]xcept as 
otherwise provided by this section, no fewer than two occupants per vehicle may be required for 
use of a HOV facility.”164 TEA-21 was the first law to eliminate the minimum two-person HOV 
vehicle occupancy requirement with respect to value pricing pilot programs.165 This allowed for 
“HOT lane” congestion pricing programs that, like the San Diego FasTrak program, allow 
vehicles with fewer than the minimal number of occupants otherwise to justify HOV lane access 
to purchase access to the HOV lanes.166  
 
ISTEA further spurred state and local governments to consider the implementation of 
congestion pricing programs (though not necessarily on Interstate Highways) by directing the 
creation of state and local transportation planning units—known as “metropolitan planning 
organizations” or “MPOs”167—and by introducing the Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality 
Improvement Program (“CMAQ Program”).168 MPOs are to develop transportation plans for 
urbanized areas,169 with the overall goal of “serv[ing] the mobility needs of people and freight 
and foster economic growth and development within and through urbanized areas, while 
minimizing transportation-related fuel consumption and air pollution..”170 Among the factors that 
MPOs were to consider in develop in generating transportation plans, under the statute as 
originally enacted, was “[t]he need to relieve congestion and prevent congestion from occurring 
where it does not yet occur.”171 Further, MPOs are to develop long-range transportation plans;172 
the original wording of the statute called for MPOs to “recommend[ ] . . . innovative financing 
techniques to finance needed projects and programs, including such techniques as . . . tolls and 
congestion pricing.”173 
 
TEA-21 revised the statute both to eliminate the mandatory consideration of congestion 
relief in developing transportation plans,174 and to delete the express reference to congestion 
                                                                                                                                                 
reconstructing and rehabilitating highway corridors that could not otherwise be adequately maintained or functionally 
improved without the collection of tolls.” 23 U.S.C. § 129 note. See generally TEA-21 § 1216(b).  
163 23 U.S.C. § 166(a)(1). An earlier version authorized “State transportation department [to] establish the 
occupancy requirements of vehicles operating in high occupancy vehicle lanes.” 23 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (repealed 
by Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, 
§ 1121(b)(1), 119 Stat. 1144, 1195 (Aug. 10, 2005). 
164 23 U.S.C. § 166(a)(2). An earlier version directed that “no fewer than 2 occupants per vehicle may be required.” 
23 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (repealed by Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for 
Users, Pub. L. 109-59, § 1121(b)(1), 119 Stat. 1144, 1195 (Aug. 10, 2005). 
165 TEA-21 § 1216(a)(5), 112 Stat. at 211-12 (amending ISTEA § 1012(b)(6) to read: “Notwithstanding section 
146(c) of title 23, United States Code, a State may permit vehicles with fewer than 2 occupants to operate in high 
occupancy vehicle lanes if the vehicles are part of a value pricing pilot program under this subsection.”); see Internal 
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, § 9006(b), Pub. L. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (July 22, 1998) 
(amending TEA-21 § 1216(a)(5) “by striking ‘146(c)’ and inserting ‘102(a)’”). 
166 See supra notes 131, 133, and accompanying text.  
167 See ISTEA § 1024(a), 105 Stat. at 1955 (codified, as amended, at 23 U.S.C. § 134).  
168 See ISTEA § 1008(a), 105 Stat. at 1932 (codified, as amended, at 23 U.S.C. § 149); The Congestion Mitigation 
and Air Quality Improvement (CMAQ) Program of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act—Guidance 
Update, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,890 (1996) [hereinafter “CMAQ Program Guidance Update].  
169 23 U.S.C. § 134(a)(2). 
170 Id. § 134(a)(1).  
171 Id. § 134(f)(2). 
172 Id. § 134(g). 
173 Id. § 134(g)(2). 
174 TEA-21 § 1203(f), 112 Stat. at 174. 
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pricing.175 Following amendment by TEA-21, the statute directs that long-range transportation 
plans “[a]ssess capital investment and other measures necessary to . . . make the most efficient 
use of existing transportation facilities to relieve vehicular congestion and maximize the mobility 
of people and goods.”176 Further, the current statute provides, for transportation management 
areas—that is, “each urbanized area with a population of over 200,000 individuals”177—that 
“transportation planning process . . . include a congestion management system that provides for 
effective management of new and existing transportation facilities eligible for funding. . . .”178 
 
The CMAQ Program is designed to encourage transportation planning with an eye not 
only to improving efficient transportation, but also to improving air quality. Emissions from 
motor vehicles contribute substantially to air pollution, and in particular can be a primary reason 
for a region’s inability to comply with national ambient air quality standards (“NAAQS”) 
generated under the federal Clean Air Act.179 The CMAQ Program provides federal funding for 
state “transportation projects or programs that will contribute to attainment of the [NAAQS], 
primarily for ozone and carbon monoxide.”180 Regulatory guidance indicates that “travel demand 
management” is one of the items for which CMAQ Program funds may be made available, and 
makes clear that travel demand management includes “road pricing measures.”181  
 
Though value pricing is in its domestic infancy, the Senate in 2004 at one point 
contemplated eliminating new value pricing programs. The bill would have repealed the 
authorization for new value pricing programs,182 although it would have allowed existing 
programs to continue.183 Ultimately, the Congress in August 2005 enacted a new transportation 
bill, dubbed the “Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for 
Users,”184 or “SAFETEA-LU.” SAFETEA-LU retains the value pricing program.185 It also 
establishes an “express lanes demonstration program.”186 The program calls for the establishment 
of fifteen toll collection facilities on the interstate system with the purpose of either managing 
congestion, reducing emissions levels, or financing roadway expansion.187 The tolls to be charged 
in such programs “may . . . var[y] in price according to time of day or level of traffic, as 
appropriate to manage congestion or improve air quality.”188 Further, the statute requires, “for 
each high occupancy vehicle facility that charges tolls under this subsection, that the tolls vary in 
                                                 
175 Id. § 1203(g)(3), 112 Stat. at 174-75.  
176 23 U.S.C. § 134(g)(2)(C)(ii) (2000). 
177 Id. § 134(i)(1). 
178 Id. § 134(i)(3). 
179 Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA must generate NAAQS for so-called constituent pollutants. The states must 
then develop “state implementation plans” that are designed to regulate in-state sources in such a way as to achieve 
compliance with the NAAQS. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410.  
180 Wahrman, supra note 21, at 188 (footnote omitted).  
181 CMAQ Program Guidance Update, supra note 168, at 50,895. See also id. at 50,896 (“The FHWA and FTA 
continue to recommend that States and MPOs put together their transportation/air quality programs using 
complementary measures that simultaneously provide alternatives to [single-occupancy vehicle] travel while reducing 
demand through pricing, parking management, regulatory or other means.”). 
182 S. 1072, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., § 1609(c)(1) (Feb. 12, 2004) (“Section 1012 of the Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Efficiency Act . . . is amended by striking subsection (b).”).  
183 Id. § 1609(c)(2) (“Notwithstanding the amendment made by paragraph (1), the Secretary shall monitor and allow 
any value pricing program established under a cooperative agreement in effect on the day before the date of enactment 
of this Act to continue.”). 
184 Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (Aug. 10, 2005). 
185 See id. § 1604(a), 119 Stat. at 1249-50. 
186 See id. § 1604(b), 119 Stat. at 1250-53. 
187 See id. § 1604(b)(2), 119 Stat. at 1250.  
188 Id. § 1604(b)(3)(B)(i), 119 Stat. at 1251.  
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price according to time of day or level of traffic, as appropriate to manage congestion or improve 
air quality.”189  
 
In sum, while federal funding may be provided for toll roads, the availability of federal 
funding for interstate highways—the most important component of the nation’s highway 
network—remains quite circumscribed. The value pricing pilot programs present the possibility 
of broader use of congestion pricing in the future, although there is some political sentiment to 
preclude expansion of such programs. 
 
D. Existing Congestion Pricing Regimes 
 
In this Section, I present a brief survey of some current U.S. congestion pricing 
programs.190 At the outset, however, it bears noting that several congestion pricing programs 
abroad—including, notably, programs in Singapore, Trondheim, Toronto, and London—have had 
considerable success. Moreover, as I have discussed above, the success of one of these 
programs—the one in Singapore—is at least somewhat responsible for the increased attention 
paid to congestion pricing regimes domestically,191 while the success of another program—the 
fledgling program in London192—may bolster prospects for even greater use of congestion pricing 
domestically. 
 
Toll roads in New Jersey (the New Jersey Turnpike) and California (the San Joaquin 
Hills Toll Road) currently feature congestion pricing.193 In addition, tolls to cross the Hudson 
River from New York to New Jersey (via the George Washington Bridge or the Lincoln or 
Holland Tunnels), and tolls to cross two bridges in Lee County Florida, are subject to congestion 
pricing.194 Plans are being developed to introduce congestion pricing on additional toll roads in 
Florida, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Ohio.195  
 
Domestically, interest in and use of lane-pricing access programs is increasing. Express 
lanes on an Orange County, California highway are already subject to congestion pricing, and 
programs are under development to introduce congestion pricing on lanes in highways in 
California, Florida, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, and Washington.196  
 
Interest in development of HOT lanes is especially intense. Besides the San Diego 
FasTrak program, HOT lanes programs are in effect on two highways in Houston, and in 
Colorado and Minnesota.197 Proposals to introduce HOT lanes are under development for 
highways in California, Florida, Georgia, and Washington,198 and are also being considered for 
highways in Maryland and Virginia.199  
                                                 
189 Id. § 1604(b)(3)(B)(ii), 119 Stat. at 1251. The statute further provides that “a State may permit motor vehicles 
with fewer than two occupants to operate in high occupancy vehicle lanes as part of a variable toll pricing program 
established under this subsection.” Id. § 1604(b)(3)(B)(iii), 119 Stat. at 1251.  
190 See Federal Highway Administration, List of Projects by Type (available at  
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/otps/projectlist.htm (last modified Aug. 10, 2007)). Note that the projects I summarize 
here are a subset of all value pricing programs; some projects (such as projects that involve parking pricing) do not fall 
under the rubric of congestion pricing (at least as I use the terminology here).  
191 See supra text accompanying note 101.  
192 See supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text.  
193 See Federal Highway Administration, supra note 191.  
194 See id.  
195 See id.  
196 See id.  
197 See id.  
198 See id.  
199 See Editorial: HOT Prospects, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2003, at A16. 
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No FAIR lanes regimes are currently in use, although plans for FAIR lanes programs are 
under development for a highway in California.200 Also, although no cordon pricing regime is in 
use domestically, a proposal to subject all East River crossings into and out of New York City’s 
Manhattan Island (combined with the existing congestion pricing regime for Hudson River 
crossings) would, if implemented, create a de facto cordon pricing regime.201 This year, Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg has proposed the introduction of cordon congestion pricing in southern 
Manhattan, although the proposal has been somewhat stymied by political opposition.202 
 
E. Economics and Public Choice of Congestion Pricing 
 
The economic underpinnings of congestion pricing are depicted above, in Figure 1. 
Essentially, congestion gives rise to an externality because drivers internalize only their own 
costs, rather than society’s actual costs. Congestion pricing regimes endeavor to remedy this 
situation by requiring drivers to internalize the costs that otherwise would be externalized.203 
 
Congestion pricing results in better allocation of the scarce resource of roadway access. It 
also reduces uneconomic overuse of roads. In addition, such programs increases government 
coffers through congestion pricing revenue. Further, congestion pricing also “saves society 
significant amounts of resources in obviating the establishment and maintenance of an oversized 
infrastructure network . . . [, with the] consequence . . . [that] much sought after tax dollars, land 
and capital would be released for more socially beneficial tasks.”204 
 
The economic benefits, and likely success, of congestion pricing regimes seem clear.205 
But public choice and political economy considerations are not as favorable to congestion pricing 
regimes as they are to the provision of new roadway capacity. First, consider that congestion 
regimes, unlike roadway capacity responses, do not, at least currently, receive substantial support 
from powerful, organized interest groups.206 In particular, the simple imposition of a congestion 
charging regime offers politicians no support from the construction industry or its workers. While 
there are industries that benefit from implementation of congestion pricing systems—for 
example, companies that manufacture the transponders on which many of the systems rely—the 
transportation and real estate construction industries seem to offer the promise of more sizeable, 
better organized support, perhaps because of the years those industries have had to hone their 
lobbying and political relations expertise.207 
 
Second, consider public reaction to proposals to implement congestion pricing. Recall 
that public choice theory does not render irrelevant public opinion. Public opinion may matter, 
both because the public may somehow may bypass interest groups and make its strong opinion 
                                                 
200 See Federal Highway Administration, supra note 191.  
201 See id.  
202 See infra notes 234-241 and accompanying text. See also Marisa Lagos, City Searches for Traffic Innovations, 
S.F. EXAMINER, Nov. 11, 2005, at 5 (discussing the possibility of a cordon congestion pricing program in San 
Francisco).  
203 See supra notes 56-57, 108, and accompanying text. Note that some commentators do not believe that all 
externalized costs should optimally be internalized. See supra note 115.  
204 Hau, supra note 111, at 224. 
205 See Strahilevitz, supra note 58, at 1246 (“[I]f current estimates are correct, a national shift to congestion pricing 
would generate societal benefits of $5 to $11 billion annually. . . .”). 
206 But see infra note 243 and accompanying text (noting that some environmental organizations have announced 
support of congestion pricing).  
207 Below, I discuss the possibility that this might change in the future. See infra Part VI.  
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know to government actors, or because interest groups may realize that they can tap into latent 
public opinion to strengthen their case to legislators.208  
 
In the case, of congestion pricing, there is apparently plenty of latent public opinion into 
which to tap. Public reaction to congestion pricing tends to be rather strongly negative. In 
particular, the public is doubtful about congestion pricing for several reasons, including concerns 
of equity, general opposition to new government fees for items that previously were offered at no 
charge, concerns over privacy, and concerns over the appropriateness of using market-based 
regimes to achieve environmental goals.209  
 
Equity concerns underlie many objections to the implementation of congestion pricing 
programs. First, to the extent that revenue from a program is seen only to fill government coffers, 
drivers, and indeed the public at large, may consider the program inequitable. Indeed, absent 
revenue recycling (i.e., government use of the money to improve the transport network), “most 
travellers will experience net losses as a result of the introduction of road user charging, as for 
most people who continue to drive [the] resulting time savings will be less than the road user 
charge and so their consumer surplus will be reduced.”210 
 
A second equity-related point is the perceived distributional impact of a congestion-
pricing regime. The burden of a congestion pricing regime might be seen to fall heavily on poorer 
people. In other words, the regime might be characterized as a regressive tax.211 Indeed, an 
efficient allocation of a resource may not always be distributionally fair, and the fact that 
efficiency should not always be rendered subservient to distributional goals in the transport 
setting is clear. Phil Goodwin observes that “there are some transport policies that nobody 
suggests should be determined by ‘willingness-to-pay’.”212 As an example, Goodwin points to the 
allocation of road space between vehicles and pedestrians, which, he contends, is not seriously 
the subject of proposed pricing regimes.213  
                                                 
208 See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.  
209 Peter Jones highlights several concerns that the public-at-large tend to express over congestion pricing schemes: 
(i) drivers have difficulty accepting a “charge for congestion”; (ii) the belief that urban road pricing is simply 
unnecessary; (iii) the belief that congestion pricing will not effectively reduce vehicular travel; (iv) skepticism about 
the effectiveness and accuracy of technology underlying congestion pricing; (v) concerns about privacy; (vi) concerns 
that a congestion pricing system based upon a particular “urban boundary” may have substantial effects on areas near 
that boundary; (vii) public perception of congestion pricing as just another tax; and (viii) the perception that congestion 
pricing is, in one way or other, unfair. Jones, supra note 114, at 265-69. 
210 Peter M. Jones, Road Pricing: The Public Viewpoint, in ROAD PRICING, supra note 29, at 159, 159 (citation 
omitted). 
211 See Jones, supra note 114, at 268 (noting the public perception of congestion pricing regime as “[j]ust [a]nother 
[f]orm of [t]axation”). 
Lior Strahilevitz compares the San Diego I-15 congestion pricing HOV lane program to a tradable pollution permit 
regime. See Strahilevitz, supra note 58, at 1288. However, the structure of the program suggests that it is more similar 
to a tax regime, insofar as no “permit” allowing access to the highway express lanes is actually tradable. A modified 
system, designed by Peter Jones to address equity concerns, bears greater similarity to a tradable pollution permit 
regime: 
[C]ar owning residents living within the charged area and other selected population groups might be 
given a number of free Travel Units per month (either using smartcard debiting system, or through an account 
held by each person). Additional units could be purchased at the standard rate or at a discounted rate (though 
in principle there could be differences here according to category of user). By taking the idea further and 
making these free Travel Units available to residents (with and without a car) and openly tradeable, then there 
would be a further redistribution mechanism from the rich to the poor. 
Jones, supra note 114, at 281. 
212 Goodwin, supra note 115, at 146 (emphasis in original). 
213 Goodwin elucidates: 
An example is the division of road space between vehicles and pedestrians. It would be possible to say that 
the relative width of sidewalk and carriageway should be determined by the amounts that pedestrians and 
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Second, to the extent that congestion charges are imposed on roads that previously were 
free, they may be perceived as a new tax. Tax increases are never popular, and “[t]here will 
inevitably be resistance to paying for something (i.e., road use) which was previously regarded as 
free at the point of use . . . .”214 This opposition will be exacerbated to the extent that the revenues 
from congestion charging regimes are seen simply to fill government coffers, as explained just 
above. 
 
Third, there are concerns about how implementation of congestion pricing would intrude 
upon privacy. Many congestion regimes would rely upon technology that could allow 
government to track people’s whereabouts.215  
 
Fourth, many people are uneasy, whether rationally or not, about the use of market-based 
approaches to regulate the environment.216 And this uneasiness is not absent in the traffic 
congestion setting. In the context of a broad 1978 study of people’s reactions to the use of charges 
as an environmental regulatory tool, Steven Kelman asked the following question in interviews 
with environmentalists: 
 
Let’s say that a parking surcharge developed as part of a transportation control 
program reflected the costs a driver imposes on society by driving a car, 
including the damages from auto pollution. If the surcharge reflected all such 
costs, would you then feel it was OK for a person to drive his car in the city 
center as long as he paid the surcharge, or would you still criticize him for not 
taking available public transportation?217 
 
Of the environmentalists questioned, “[s]ixty-seven percent . . . said they would still criticize the 
car driver . . . .”218 
 
It is possible to address some of these obstacles to implementation of congestion pricing 
regimes through education. For example, public concerns about the need for, efficacy, and 
general propriety, of congestion pricing regimes might be addressed through education of the 
public as to the proper working of the regimes.219  
                                                                                                                                                 
vehicles are willing to contribute, or even more specifically that pedestrian-actuated traffic signals should 
require the insertion of a coin. The logic in one sense is similar to that of road pricing, but it does not 
command serious consideration. Nor does there exist (as far as I know) an underground of hard-line road 
pricers biding their time until the moment is right to implement pedestrian charging with push-chair 
supplements and a penalty for elderly slow walkers. 
Id. Goodwin’s point clearly has merit, although one might argue that he overstates the case somewhat, in that allocation 
of public spaces are in fact sometimes divided among different users when supply of the resource becomes insufficient 
to meet overall demand. For example, public spaces in parks are often divided between cyclists and rollerbladers on the 
one hand, and pedestrians and joggers on the other.  
214 Jones, supra note 210, at 159. See Strahilevitz, supra note 58, at 1248 (“Loss-aversion theory tells us that these 
types of changes are likely to spark strong opposition. Over the years, commuters will increasingly see themselves as 
entitled to use the roadways that their tax dollars helped build and maintain” (footnotes omitted)). 
This may be true to a lesser extent for roads which had been flat-rate toll roads but on which a congestion pricing 
regime now is superimposed (the George Washington Bridge, for example—see supra text accompanying note 194).  
215 See Strahilevitz, supra note 58, at 1248-49.  
216 See generally STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES? ECONOMISTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 46-53 (1981). 
217 Steven Kelman, Economic Incentives and Environmental Policy: Politics, Ideology, and Philosophy, in 
INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 291, 314 (Thomas C. Schelling ed., 1983). 
218 Id.  
219 Peter Jones argues: 
Based on the concerns expressed by the public, it is evident that four general arguments have to be won before 
road pricing can be introduced into urban areas with majority public support. Namely that:  
Economic Efficiency versus Public Choice 37
 
Other obstacles might be addressed through structural design choices. For example, 
concerns over privacy could be ameliorated by officially restricting the possible use of 
information gathered by virtue of congestion pricing regimes. And the problem of substantial 
impact on boundary regions could be addressed by designing regimes that do not rely upon 
boundaries as “on/off switches” for the application of congestion pricing.  
 
The “no new tax” objection also can be addressed structurally, by hypothecating the 
revenue from the regime—i.e., by promising that the congestion fees gathered will be used in 
large measure either to improve the highway or transit system, or to offset some of the 
distributional injustices to which the regime might be seen to give rise. Indeed, public support for 
congestion pricing schemes jumps substantially when the schemes are said to contemplate 
revenue recycling.220 Along the lines of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Twersky’s “prospect 
theory”221 and the literature on framing and how mental accounting may affect people’s 
perceptions of various choices,222 it may be that people will more readily accept the “loss” of a 
“new tax” when they perceive in connection with it a gain in some other area. Another useful 
structural step is to make the pricing scheme transparent and understandable;223 this will help 
people both to understand and accept the program, and to make wise use of the pricing 
information that the program provides in practice. 
 
Revenue recycling is also an important element of insulating congestion pricing regimes 
from the charge that they are inequitable. Revenue from congestion charges can be used, for 
example, to maintain existing roads, to improve the mass transportation system for drivers who 
are priced out of roadway use, or even to subsidize poorer users’ use of restricted roadways.224 
Also pertinent to the equity inquiry is whether the advent of congestion pricing leaves reasonable 
substitutes available to the public at no charge (or at least at a lesser charge). 
 
In the end, however, the mere fact that some of the public’s objections to congestion 
charges might be combated via education (or otherwise) is irrelevant to the public choice 
inquiry—irrelevant, that is, unless some interest group or political entrepreneur decides to try to 
undertake the necessary education in order to shift public opinion, and then presumably to make 
use of the change in public opinion. Thus, even with all these education and design options, 
public choice theory predicts that the path to implementation of congestion pricing regimes on a 
broad scale appears to remain an uphill one. Most particularly, industry, worker, labor, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
1. there is a need to take some action to restrain traffic levels; 
2. the alternatives to road pricing are ineffective or insufficient; 
3. road pricing is a practical and effective measure; and  
4. equity concerns can be addressed. 
Jones, supra note 114, at 269-70. 
220 See Jones, supra note 210, at 168 (“Hypothecating revenues does seem to increase public support [for 
congestion pricing systems] considerably – if, as a consequence, improvements in transport systems can be achieved. 
People then feel that they are getting something for their money, either through improvements to the road network or in 
the alternative methods of travel.”); see id. at 168-70 (presenting survey results validating this proposition).  
221 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, in 
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 17 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000). 
222 See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 221, at 
241. 
223 See Börje Johansson & Lars-Göran Mattsson, From Theory and Policy Analysis to the Implementation of Road 
Pricing: The Stockholm Region in the 1990s, in ROAD PRICING, supra note 29, at 181, 185.  
224 See Richardson & Bae, supra note 113, at 248-49 (“Using windshield transponders . . . , [congestion] prices 
could vary with income upon submission of W-2s (that is, official payroll summaries) and income tax returns.”); supra 
notes 134-136 and accompanying text (discussing FAIR lanes). 
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(therefore) political support remains substantially in favor of the new roadway construction 
option. 
 
VI. ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC CHOICE EVALUATION OF NEW ROADWAY CAPACITY AND 
CONGESTION CHARGES 
 
In this Part, I turn to the question of whether economic efficiency or public choice has 
greater predictive accuracy in the context of traffic congestion. I earlier showed that generation of 
new roadway capacity is likely to be economically inefficient (at least over the long term) but 
nonetheless likely at present to receive critical support from a public choice perspective, and also 
that congestion charges are more likely to be economically efficient, but less likely at present to 
be viable from a public choice perspective.225 Because the provision of new roadway capacity 
continues to dominate congestion pricing,226 I have little trouble concluding that the public choice 
                                                 
225 See supra Parts IV, V. 
226 There are other governmental responses to the problem of traffic congestion, none of which has either been used 
as extensively as the provision of new roadway capacity, or has the promise of congestion pricing. First, there are 
market-based instruments other than congestion pricing. See supra note 89.  
Land use planning is another possible response to problems of traffic congestion. Land use regulation generally 
occurs at the state, and especially the local, level, although Congress has to a limited extent sought to impose, 
indirectly, land use controls on lands near federally-financed highways, through controls on the availability of funds. 
For example, the full federal highway funding is conditioned on a state implementing programs to restrict billboard 
advertising near highways, see 23 U.S.C. § 131(b), as well as programs to restrict the presence of outdoor junkyards 
near highways, see id. § 136(b). Land use planning tends to be particularly dominated in the political arena by powerful 
interest groups, especially those who favor development. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing the 
public choice pressure in favor of development, and therefore generally in opposition to land use restrictions); Buzbee, 
supra note 79, at 77-91 (presenting an overview of the political economy of “urban sprawl”). Rarely, moreover, are 
land use restrictions used to “undo” development as a way to alleviate traffic congestion. Cf. Michael Janofsky, In 
Towns that Slowed Growth, Backlash Stirs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, sec. 1, at 20 (“In Colorado, where the economy 
has sagged for two years, several small towns eager to spur development and increase the local tax base are turning 
away from growth restrictions.”). Land use restrictions are of little use in combating traffic congestion in the short run. 
While they may be used to constrain the further development of congestion in the long run, they are unlikely practically 
to offer a complete solution to traffic congestion problems. (I discuss below in this footnote the possible use of impact 
fees, which function in connection with land use controls and providing new roadway capacity.) 
Another possible governmental response to traffic congestion is behavior modification—that is, attempts by the 
government to alter people’s behavior so as to reduce traffic congestion. Often grouped under the title “transportation 
demand management” or “TDM,” see, e.g., Robert H. Freilich & S. Mark White, Transportation Congestion and 
Growth Management: Comprehensive Approaches to Resolving America’s Quality of Life Crisis, 24 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
915, 962-63 (1991) (discussing TDM); Stanley D. Abrams, Implementing the Adequate Public Facilities Ordinance to 
Manage Transportation Congestion, SE11 ALI-ABA 595 (1999), such attempts can take different forms. First, the 
government might, whether through incentives or simply requests, attempt to induce businesses to stagger working 
hours so as to reduce rush hour congestion. For example, the Clean Air Act authorizes states leeway to include in 
attainment plans for severe ozone nonattainment areas requirements that may induce employers to stagger working 
hours. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(d)(1)(B); see also Michael Herz, Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional 
Micromanagement: A Potential Collision in Clean Air Act Interpretation, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 188-92 (1992) 
(critiquing the prior, more exacting version of section 7511a(d)(1)(B) for its erroneous emphasis on vehicle occupancy 
as opposed to average ridership); Oren, supra note 31, at 143-45 (describing the short-lived, unsuccessful life of the 
prior version of section 7511a(d)(1)(B)); EMMERINK, supra note 64, at 257-69 (presenting an empirical analysis of 
worker schedule flexibility). Second, the government might attempt to induce individuals to choose public 
transportation over driving as a means of transportation. For example, under the TransitChek program in New York 
City, administered by TransitCenter, Inc. (a non-profit corporation), employers give employees funds to pay for mass 
transit tax-free; the employers obtain a tax advantage in terms of reduced payroll taxes. See TransitCenter, Inc., 
TransitChek: Company Benefits, www.transitcenter.com/benefits/tc_co/overview.htm (visited Dec. 3, 2005). (Note, 
however, that the absence of congestion pricing regimes on highways may necessitate greater subsidization of mass 
transit. See supra note 63.) Third, the government might restrict access to certain lanes to automobiles that are occupied 
by a certain minimum number of persons (so-called “high-occupancy vehicle” or “HOV” lanes, or “carpool” lanes); 
government might also arrange for meeting points to reduce transactions costs of forming a carpool.. Fourth, the 
government might provide information about traffic congestion, allowing individual users to take that information into 
account in plotting their travel routes, with the possibility of overall reductions in congestion. See generally EMMERINK, 
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supra note 64, at 9-34. Behavioral modification approaches run into the entrenched American cultural ideal of driving a 
vehicle. See supra note 80 (discussing the importance to Americans of driving vehicles, and surveying how that ideal 
has frustrated attempts to change driving patterns through behavioral modification). Cf. David W. Dunlap, Planner 
Seek More Streets Through Trade Center Site, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2004, at B3 (“One of the underlying principles [of 
the plan to open more streets to traffic at the former World Trade Center site] is that streets work better when they are 
filled with cars and trucks. In contrast, pedestrian-only zones, which were once a favored device of planners, can 
sometimes seem lifeless.”). For this reason, behavioral modification that is not directly supported by adequate monetary 
incentives is unlikely to succeed in substantially ameliorating traffic congestion.  
Government might take a more forceful hand in trying to achieve behavioral modification by enacting programs 
that (at least facially) mandate changes in people’s driving behavior. Among these “command-and-control” 
approaches—so-called because the government centrally commands and controls societal actors’ behavior—are the 
establishment of parking controls, the promotion of employer-based mandatory trip reduction programs, and the 
implementation of an “odds and evens” license plate vehicle authorization system. Hau, supra note 111, at 223. 
Command-and-control regimes remain the dominant form of domestic environmental regulation, despite intense 
criticism of such regimes from the academy. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental 
Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 21, 24-25 (2001). Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of command-and-control 
regulation is that it unnecessarily deprives societal actors of flexibility in complying with governmental goals. See id.; 
Nash, supra note 89, at 486. This lack of flexibility means that societal actors will have to engage in particular behavior 
to comply with the government mandate even if other behavior would be less onerous and costly and still achieve the 
government’s goal. Similar criticism can be lodged against command-and-control approaches in the congestion context. 
Such approaches also unnecessarily restrain societal actors’ flexibility. See Hau, supra note 111, at 223 (comparing 
command-and-control approaches to “market-based measures” that “permit[ ] motorists the maximum flexibility of 
choosing when, where and by what mode they desire to travel”). As Timothy Hau explains, “command and control 
measures that take aim at altering motorists’ travel behavior all impose a great deal of inconvenience and costs – both 
explicit and implicit.” Id. Moreover, even putting these points to the side, it is unclear how successful behaviorally-
motivated command-and-control regulation can be in the congestion context. As explained above, the individual’s 
attitude that driving is a right is quite robust. While one would expect a mandatory program—backed up by 
government sanction—to be more successful than a non-coercive program to the same effect, nonetheless one might 
question just how successful such a program might be. Cf. Ann E. Carlson, Recycling Norms, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 
1295-96 (2001) (drawing on empirical evidence to conclude that the degree to which recycling behavior is convenient 
may encourage the behavior more than a social norm in favor of the behavior). 
Yet another response to congestion is to invoke market-based measures to attack the congestion problem 
indirectly—i.e., other than directly through the use of a mechanism like congestion pricing that uses market mechanics 
directly to affect traffic congestion levels. Indirect market-based measures include annual vehicle license fees, gasoline 
taxes, and setting economic parking charges and parking taxes. Hau, supra note 111, at 224. While indirect market-
based approaches will have some effect on congestion, the fact that they are not focused directly on congestion, and do 
not compel internalization of congestion costs, means that they will not be efficient at attaining congestion goals. 
Consider first the option of annual vehicle license fees. Such fees are generally quite low, and would have to be raised 
significantly to have any effect on vehicle ownership and, therefore, roadway usage. Moreover, even if these fees were 
increased substantially, still they would represent merely a periodic (though hefty) charge; the fee would not be tied to 
roadway usage. Thus, one would expect that, once someone made the decision to incur the fee, that person would have 
no disincentive against engaging in inefficient travel. Hau, supra note 111, at 224. 
Much like annual vehicle fees, gasoline tax rates in the United States are generally too low to have any substantial 
effect on roadway usage. But, even putting that to the side, “[i]ncreases in gasoline taxes . . . affect only the amount of 
travel and are ineffective in dealing with congestion whenever and wherever it occurs.” Id. Accord Jerry L. Mashaw, 
The Legal Structure of Frustration: Alternative Strategies for Public Choice Concerning Federally Aided Highway 
Construction, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 74 n.247 (1973). 
Parking fees are more closely tied to roadway usage than either vehicle fees or gasoline taxes. But still the 
relationship is too tenuous to guarantee an appropriate and full effect on traffic congestion. See Hau, supra note 111, at 
224; Mashaw, supra, at 74 n.247. Further, “parking charges based on time can operate to increase congestion by 
promoting a more rapid turnover of cars.” Mashaw, supra, at 74 n.247. Still, the introduction of parking charges should 
have some ameliorative effect on traffic congestion. See id. (“[T]o the extent that parking charges which reflect the real 
costs of street use in particular areas would deter motorists from driving and encourage transfer to public transport or 
fringe parking, these charges would be beneficial in allocating resources to higher value users.”). However, because 
parking charges alone are unlikely to address the congestion problem in its entirety, parking charges ideally “should be 
used along with other pricing techniques.” Id.  
Another indirect market-based mechanism is the use of impact fees imposed on land developers to finance road 
construction and maintenance. Impact fees are imposed, generally by local governments, on developers, with the funds 
received used to finance public service infrastructure needs, e.g., James C. Nicholas & Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, 
Market Based Approaches to Environmental Preservation: To Environmental Mitigation Fees and Beyond, 43 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 837, 843 (2003), including transportation services, e.g., id. at 844 (identifying “[t]transportation services 
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story has greater weight at present. I then consider whether the slight movement toward greater 
acceptance of congestion pricing might signal a weakening in the public choice explanation and a 
strengthening of the efficiency story. The movement can also be explained on public choice 
grounds, however. Moreover, the particular contexts in which much of the movement toward 
congestion pricing is occurring suggest that it is a shift in the relevant interest groups and public 
opinion, and not a shift in explanatory story, that underlies the movement toward greater 
acceptance of congestion pricing. 
  
Because, at present, the efficiency story predicts an increased reliance on property rights 
through congestion pricing regimes, while the public choice story does not, the traffic congestion 
setting provides a natural one in which to measure the predictive accuracy of the stories. As I 
noted above, the generation of new roadway capacity remains the dominant government response 
to the problem of traffic congestion. The absence of the emergence of property rights—through 
the implementation of congestion pricing regimes or otherwise—strongly suggests, in turn, that 
the public choice story for the evolution of property rights dominates the efficiency story.  
 
But there are signs that the dominance of new roadway capacity may be fading, at least 
somewhat. Even if it remains quite popular and even though opposition to congestion charges 
remains strong, the fact is that recent years have seen an increase in the implementation of 
congestion pricing regimes, with even more regimes in the planning stages.227  
 
The shift, albeit perhaps comparatively small at this juncture, suggests that the traditional 
dominance of the public choice story is weakening. And, indeed, one might argue that, as traffic 
congestion has continued to worsen—that is, as the size of the externality has grown—so, too, has 
pressure grown on government actors to respond to the problem in a more efficient way. And, 
indeed, this accords with the understanding that the strength of the efficiency story increases as 
the size of the externality increases.228 In addition, the efficiency story predicts an increase in 
property rights as the cost of delineating property rights drops.229 And, indeed, the move toward 
congestion prices corresponds to drops in the cost of transponders technology and in the time 
necessary to collect congestion-varied tolls.  
 
With respect to the decrease in influence of the public choice story, one might argue that 
road construction was popular among large, powerful interest groups, and they simply co-opted 
the congestion problem as yet another justification for road construction. But once the congestion 
                                                                                                                                                 
such as highways and bridges [as] the [second] most common type of impact fee”). See Gregory M. Parkhurst & Jason 
F. Shogren, Evaluating Incentive Mechanisms for Conserving Habitat, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1093, 1139 n.266 (2003) 
(“Impact fees are already being used in most all communities—for example, development projects are charged an 
impact fee to pay for the construction of new roads necessary to control congestion.”); see also Louis J. Columbo, 
Implementing the Vision: Impact Fees and the Albuquerque Metropolitan Planned Growth Strategy, 43 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 887 (2003) (discussing the design of impact fees in the Albuquerque metropolitan area). The fees can be, 
and often generally are, set by reference to the marginal increase in demand for services to which the developer’s action 
ultimately will give rise. Cf. Nick Rosenberg, Comment, Development Impact Fees: Is Limited Cost Internalization 
Actually Smart Growth?, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 641 (2003) (discussing development impact fees as a means of 
internalizing cost). Impact fees do force internalization of some congestion-related costs, but it is developers, not 
roadway users, on whom internalization is imposed. See supra note 89 (discussing the environmental law’s “polluter 
pays principle,” and its application in the context of traffic congestion). In this sense, while impact fees should mitigate 
congestion in the long run, their use will not address congestion problems in the short term, and in general will not 
address congestion that results from traffic originating in other areas. (Impact fees can be seen as a hybrid between two 
tools—congestion charges and land use planning. See infra note 246.)  
227 See supra Part V.D.  
228 See supra text accompanying note 11; Rose, supra note 10, at 8 (noting that the scope and complexity of 
environmental regulation will depend upon the extent to which use of the underlying resource is congested).  
229 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
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problem becomes “too large,” the arguments in favor of road construction face competition from 
economic pressure for a “real” solution to traffic congestion. 
 
That political opposition to congestion pricing remains robust even in the face of strong 
efficiency pressures to implement such regimes cannot be doubted. First, although it was not 
enacted in that form—the fact that, at this late date and despite the success of pilot congestion 
pricing programs—a bill was considered in the Senate that would have curtailed pilot congestion 
pricing programs.230   
 
Second, if one had to identify a setting in the United States in which congestion pricing 
would face the least opposition, it would probably be New York City. Politically, the city tends to 
be quite liberal (at least compared to the rest of the United States),231 which suggests that one 
might expect less opposition to congestion pricing on the ground that it imposes a new tax.232 
Nowhere else in the United States, moreover, is reliance upon public transit more possible or 
more strongly engrained and accepted by the populace.233 And the city suffers from tremendous 
traffic woes. 
 
Even in New York City, however, it has taken Mayor Michael Bloomberg years formally 
to advance a congestion pricing proposal, the fate of which even now remains uncertain. The 
mayor initially backed away from a proposal to implement a proposal to charge vehicles that 
enter Manhattan Island,234 and this year finally proposed a cordon pricing scheme for traffic 
entering Manhattan south of 86th Street.235 The plan was received enthusiastically by New York 
State Governor Eliot Spitzer (at least initially) and the U.S. Department of Transportation.236 Still, 
political opposition from the “outer boroughs”—that is, those areas of the city where public 
transit is less accessible and commutes on public transit are longer237—is strong.238 Further, state 
                                                 
230 See supra notes 182-183 and accompanying text. 
231 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Governance: The Secession of Staten 
Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-Determination, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 843 (1992) (noting that 
Staten Island produces many of the City’s Republican elected officials and is “the only borough that frequently votes 
Republican in municipal election”); Karen I. Chang, Note, The Party’s Over: Establishing Nonpartisan Municipal 
Elections in New York City, 11 J.L. & POL’Y 579, 589 n.55 (2003) (“More than sixty-five percent of all registered 
voters are members of the Democratic Party. About eighty percent of voters who are registered with a party are 
registered Democrats.” (citation omitted)).  
232 On the other hand, objections to congestion pricing grounded in concerns of fairness might be more prevalent. 
233 Patrick McGeehan, Mass Transit Grows as Commuters’ Trip of Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2006, at B1 (citing 
census data for the conclusion that “[n]o other American city makes half as much use of mass transit”).  
234 See Sewell Chan, Driving in Manhattan? You Pay, Under One Idea, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2005, at B2.  
235 See Thomas J. Lueck, Bloomberg Draws a 25-Year Blueprint for a Greener City, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2007, at 
B1.  
236 See Danny Hakim & Ray Rivera, City Traffic Pricing Wins U.S. and Spitzer’s Favor, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2007, 
at A1. 
237 See McGeehan, supra note 233, at B1 (“New York’s reliance on its transit system explains why the boroughs 
other than Manhattan perennially top the list of American counties with the longest commutes.”).  
238 E.g., Andy Newman, Outside Manhattan, Many Oppose Bloomberg’s Traffic Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2007, at 
B1; William Neuman, Bigger Push for Charging Drivers Who Use the Busiest Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2006, at 
B1 (identifying “a City Council member who represents some neighborhoods in eastern Queens that are far from 
subway lines and where residents with jobs in Manhattan are more likely to drive to work” as “[o]ne of the most 
outspoken opponents of congestion pricing”). But see Ray Rivera, Queens Leader Supports Bloomberg’s Traffic Plan, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2007, at B3 (noting the support of the chair of the Queens Democratic party for congestion 
pricing).  
In the end, it seems that the consolidation that enabled New York City to grow into the great metropolis it is today, 
see, e.g., William D. Solecki & Robin Leichenko, Urbanization and the Metropolitan Environment: Lessons from New 
York and Shanghai, 48 ENVT. 8 (2006), may also impede the introduction of congestion pricing. 
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legislators, who had to approve the plan, were tempered239; State Assembly Speaker Sheldon 
Silver was critical of the proposal.240 In the end, all that the Mayor has thus far been able to 
accomplish is the appointment of a commission to examine ways to reduce traffic congestion, 
including the possibility of congestion pricing.241 Thus, political power continues to dog 
efficiency concerns, even in New York City.  
 
The continued strength—and success—of political opposition to congestion pricing 
suggests that congestion pricing will emerge not only when congestion becomes bad enough that 
efficiency concerns become too great to ignore, but also when political interests align behind 
congestion pricing. Thus, to the extent that there is a shift toward greater implementation of 
congestion pricing, it is simply the strength of the relevant interest group players, and perhaps 
public opinion, that is shifting. First, consider the possibility that support for congestion pricing 
among reasonably powerful interest groups may be growing. As transponder technology 
continues to flourish generally with respect to toll collection, the transponder industry will 
continue to grow. And, over time, there is likely to be greater interest on the part of the 
transponder industry to lobby for expanded use of transponders, including through 
implementation of congestion pricing regimes. In addition, while they remain divided on the 
question,242 some environmental groups have endorsed the use of congestion charges.243 It is 
possible that these groups have offset somewhat the traditional interest group opposition to 
congestion charging in favor of new roadway capacity; indeed, they may even have used—or 
may use in the future—education to try to sway public opinion in favor of congestion charges.244 
This accords well with President Bush’s decision to appoint a Transportation Secretary who 
favors expansion of congestion pricing.245 
 
                                                 
239 See Nicholas Confessore, In Legislators’ Scrutiny, Traffic Proposal Faces Hard Questioning, N.Y. TIMES, June 
9, 2007, at B4. See also Nicholas Confessore, Pricing and Partisan Politics, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2007, at B5 (“New 
York City's outer boroughs and suburbs, hotbeds of anti-pricing sentiment, are also home to many Senate Republicans 
who are considered vulnerable to a Democratic challenge. But congestion pricing is a key priority for Mr. Bloomberg, a 
Republican who has donated hundreds of thousands of dollars to Republican senators.”). (It remains to be seen whether 
the mayor’s decision to leave the Republican party changes this calculus.)  
240 See, e.g., Danny Hakim, Silver Challenges Health Benefits Promised in Manhattan Toll Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 
11, 2007, at B1.  
241 See Nicholas Confessore, Spitzer Signs Bill to Put Congestion Pricing Plan on Track, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 
2007, at B5 (describing a state bill, “[t]he product of a marathon negotiation that concluded July 19,” that “create[s] a 
17-member commission to consider different plans for reducing traffic congestion in New York, including the pricing 
scheme favored by Mr. Bloomberg”); William Neumann, Members Named for Panel Studying Traffic Pricing Plan, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2007, at B2.  
Even this small step was sufficient to gain access to some federal funding, although release of the funds is 
contingent upon a congestion pricing plan being adopted by both the City Council and state legislature by March 2008. 
See William Neumann, New York to Get U.S. Traffic Aid, but with Catch, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2007, at B1. 
242 See generally Merrill, supra note 4, at 294 (noting the divide among environmental organizations with respect to 
market-based environmental regulatory instruments, and suggesting reasons why some environmental organizations 
have shifted position to endorse such instruments); cf. Keohane et al., supra note 15, at 353-56 (describing the 
community of environmental organizations as predominantly anti-market-based instrument, with a few “outlier[s],” and 
discussing reasons for this perhaps somewhat counterintuitive state of affairs).  
243 See, e.g., NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, DAMAGE REPORT: ENVIRONMENT AND THE 105TH CONGRESS 
ch. 4 (1998) (available at http://www.nrdc.org/legislation/damage/chap4.asp) (citing the “Value Pricing Pilot Program, 
which will use market-based user fees to help reduce congestion and air pollution and promote energy efficiency,” as 
an example of “positive environmental provisions” in TEA-21); Environmental Defense, Tolling (Congestion Pricing), 
(available at http://www.environmentaldefense.org/article.cfm?ContentID=4763 (last modified Sept. 15, 2005)) .  
244 See supra note 219 and accompanying text.  
David King, Michael Manville, and Donald Shoup argue that the support of municipalities also can be harnessed by 
earmarking funds from freeway congestion pricing for municipal use. See David A. King, Michael Manville & Donald 
Shoup, The Political Calculus of Congestion Pricing, 14 TRANSPORT POLICY 111 (2007).  
245 See supra text accompanying note 2.  
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The location of the current frontier for congestion pricing lends credence to the continued 
strength of the public choice story. Other than major metropolitan areas, like London and New 
York, where the congestion externality has worsened and the possibility of introducing new roads 
is practically impossible, congestion pricing has emerged (to the extent it has emerged at all) in 
three basic settings: roadways (or bridge or tunnel portions of roadways) that already were subject 
to tolling, new roadways, new lanes on existing roadways, and HOT lanes.246 The fact that 
congestion pricing has begun to take hold in these contexts conforms to public choice predictions, 
on several grounds. First, the implementation of a congestion pricing regime on a new road—or 
on new lanes on an existing road—is not likely to be seen as the imposition of a fee for something 
that previously was provided for free. Thus, public opposition to congestion pricing under such 
conditions is less intense.247  
 
Second, the fact that new roadway construction will be undertaken means that the support 
of the transportation and real estate construction industries, their workers, and organized labor 
should in large measure persist. Congestion pricing would be seen as part-and-parcel with new 
roadway construction, rather than as a competitor to it. 
 
Third, the fact that only new roadway capacity is to be subject to congestion pricing 
means that preexisting capacity will remain open to the public at no charge. This will blunt 
concerns, and objections, about the equitable impact of congestion charging, for there will remain 
options not subject to congestion pricing that drivers can use.248 
 
Fourth, it may be that greater public interest in environmental goals will spur support for 
congestion pricing. Congestion pricing may be seen to be consistent with environmentalism. 
Support for congestion pricing may increase substantially to the extent that environmental 
organizations come to accept the use of market-based mechanisms.249  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
In this Paper, I have considered the responses that the two economic explanations for the 
emergence of property rights—the efficiency and public choice stories250—predicted in response 
to scarcity in the resource of roadway access. I demonstrated that, of the two primary 
governmental responses to the problem of traffic congestion, one—the generation of roadway 
capacity—is currently favored by the public choice story for the evolution of property rights, 
while the other—congestion charges—is currently preferred by the efficiency story. While 
congestion pricing is an attractive means by which to combat traffic congestion from an economic 
perspective, implementation of such regimes is today hindered by their general inability to garner 
political support. In contrast, the provision of new roadway capacity, while likely ineffective—
and perhaps even detrimental—from an efficiency perspective, is likely at present to be a 
successful strategy in the political arena. I also speculated that, while a slight movement toward 
                                                 
246 See supra text accompanying notes 193-199.  
Cf. Johansson & Mattsson, supra note 224, at 184-85 (arguing that a congestion pricing regime is most likely to be 
implemented when presented as a “package” approach). Another possible “package” approach would be to meld new 
roadway capacity, congestion charging, land use regulation, and impact fees. See supra note 226 (describing impact 
fees as a hybrid between congestion charges land use planning).  
247 See Strahilevitz, supra note 58, at 1247 (“Notably, . . . congestion pricing for newly constructed toll roads 
garners significantly higher public support.”). 
248 This might not be true in the case of congestion charges being introduced on a new road that is the first and only 
road in an area.  
249 See supra note 243 and accompanying text.  
250 See Strahilevitz, supra note 58, at 1288 (comparing the San Diego HOT lane regime to tradable pollution permit 
regimes). 
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greater acceptance of congestion pricing might signal that the efficiency story has overtaken the 
public choice story in terms of explanatory power, the better explanation is that it is instead the 
public choice inputs, and not the explanatory paradigm, that have shifted.  
 
The relative explanatory power of the two stories in the context of traffic congestion 
provides insight into the more general question of the relative strength of the efficiency and 
public choice accounts for the development of property rights. The case of traffic congestion 
strongly suggests that the public choice account has greater predictive accuracy than does the 
efficiency account, at least at comparatively low levels of resource use congestion. At higher 
levels of resource use congestion, it appears that greater pressure appears to move toward a more 
efficient regime. Even then, however, it seems that public choice at least controls the specific 
nature of the shift toward greater efficiency, if indeed it does not control the shift entirely.  
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